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Summary 
Financial markets have evolved to become complex adaptive systems highly reliant on the 
communication speeds and processing power afforded by digital systems. Their failure could 
cause severe disruption to the provision of financial services and possibly the wider economy. 
In this study we consider whether a perspective from the nuclear industry can provide 
additional insights. 
The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of Dr Anne Wetherilt, and not those 
of the Bank of England. 
Extended summary 
Introduction 
Financial markets have evolved to become complex adaptive systems highly reliant on the 
communication speeds and processing power afforded by digital systems. Their failure could 
cause severe disruption to the provision of financial services and possibly the wider economy. 
In this study we consider whether a perspective from the nuclear industry can provide 
additional insights. 
In fact there are a very wide range of areas where the issues and practices in the nuclear 
industry might resonate with those raised by the evolution of computer-based trading and in 
this report we focus on: 
• The approaches to systemic risk definition and evaluation; 
• The definition of protection system parameters, risk controls and architecture; 
• The need for trust in computer-based systems. 
Approaches to systemic risk 
We begin by examining a number of basic questions: how are the overall risks from a nuclear 
plant defined and evaluated, and how does this compare with financial markets. 
We consider a serious nuclear incident that has the potential for the release of radioactivity with 
associated plant damage as a “systemic event” and hence make the link to a financial market 
crash: an event that both damages the market and also potentially impacts the wider financial 
system and the broader economy. 
The development of the nuclear industry approach to safety has been driven by the need to 
engineer systems that provide social and economic benefits with tolerable risks, to evaluate 
and explain the nature and extent of these risks and to provide a framework that allows for 
scrutiny at varying levels of independence ranging from technical experts within the industry as 
well as pressure groups and those who, quite legitimately, hold very different values and 
worldviews. 
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For the nuclear and finance sector we consider: 
• The basic concepts of hazard, risk and accident;  
• Probabilistic Safety Analysis and the concept of a Design Basis;  
• Tolerability of risk and the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle and 
• Numerical risk targets. 
Our analysis points to the following similarities and differences: 
• When thinking about large-scale risks, both industries employ the concept of systemic risk. 
• Both industries use probabilistic concepts of risk and impact. 
• The nuclear industry has a clear notion of tolerable level of risks and it can set numerical 
targets. Hence, it is able to explicitly assess trade-offs between risk reduction and costs 
(ALARP). 
• In its thinking about financial market crashes, the finance industry relies to a large extent on 
probabilistic methods, using historical data. This is complemented by stress testing, using 
both historical and theoretical stress scenarios. There is also much emphasis on 
understanding past events so that potential future problems can be avoided. 
• Although these past events have undesirable features, which can be measured precisely, 
there is no equivalent of the ALARP principle and there are no numerical targets. 
In addition, it is useful to note the following particular aspects of the nuclear safety analysis and 
risk framework: 
• The nuclear industry has a formalised approach to defining the classes of consequence, the 
categories and frequencies of initiating events. It uses using theory, models and experiment 
to justify the risk analysis. 
• This means that the industry can set risk targets for classes of accident and different classes 
of people, and discusses tolerability and proportionality in reducing them further. 
• In doing so, the industry accepts that many things are hard to quantify, but there is 
nonetheless an emphasis on ranking risks, setting targets for risk reduction, and debating 
whether both the risks and the targets are accurate and acceptable. 
• The nuclear safety analysis framework allows systematic design of protection and mitigation 
systems that cover not only what they have to do, but also how much they have to be trusted. 
These systems use diverse mechanisms to ensure that the overall protection works when it is 
needed. 
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• The nuclear industry also places greater emphasis on explaining risks to society at large. This 
in part drives the quantification of risk as there needs to be a basis for comparing different 
types and sources of risk. 
Looking ahead, one could question whether the rapid development of computer-based trading 
in financial markets requires the adoption of additional risk concepts and tools. Our analysis 
suggests a number of questions that are worth asking (see conclusions). 
Protection parameters and risk controls 
Having defined the key risk concepts used in the nuclear and financial markets context, we 
compare their respective use of risk controls and observe the following: 
• Both employ risk controls, based on thresholds beyond which operations need to be halted 
(or slowed down). These controls are normally subject to regulatory supervision. 
• In the nuclear industry, the risk controls are the result of a systematic engineering analysis, 
summarized in the protection envelope and the Fault and Protection Schedule. 
• In financial markets, risk controls typically depend on a smaller and less complex set of 
parameters (e.g. traded prices or message volumes). 
• Unlike the nuclear protection systems, there is no formal mechanism for describing how much 
the controls themselves have to be trusted (e.g. in terms of probability of failure on demand, 
probability of spurious activation). 
We provide a brief overview of the control and protection of a nuclear plant that raises a 
number of issues that may be of relevance as financial markets consider how to adapt existing 
risk controls to the future computerized trading environment: 
• Engineering succeeds by making the complex systems controllable and predictable (within 
limits). Although the underlying processes are complex and complicated the ability to model 
and design the plant and to have a scientific based understanding of what might happen 
allows the functional aspects of the protection (controls) to be relatively simple. However 
there are more onerous requirements on the non-functional aspects (e.g. the probability of 
failing, the response time) as the systems really do have to operate when needed. 
• The ability to engineer a control and protection system relies on observability of the system. 
The notion that the financial market is an observable system in readily identified states is only 
partially true. It is clear in our review of market crashes that there are competing theories and 
perspectives. There is evidence that some crashes appear to just happen and that these are 
irreducible and so there is no difference between a transition to a systemic loss and an 
everyday one. Others would argue that indeed there is a difference; it is just that we do not 
(yet) have the means to identify the states that precede a systemic event. This has 
implications for the extent to which market controls can be engineered. 
• Protection systems have authority to override any other system and force a shut down. If they 
operate when not needed (e.g. due to internal failures, operator error) they can cause 
spurious plant disturbances with consequential economic costs and safety implications. There 
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is a need to define performance measures for spurious activation (e.g. once every 10 years) 
as well as for the probability of failures per demand. 
• There is trade off between economic benefits and having a simple protection envelope. As the 
understanding of the nuclear plant has developed over the years, protection envelopes have 
become more complex and computer based, facilitating more efficient operation. There can 
be considerable off-line data analysis and modelling to derive the parameters for these 
systems: so that trust is needed in both the protection algorithms and the data. 
• Adaptation and learning is very important, but in a nuclear plant they occur in different 
timebands from the control and protection actions e.g. months for procedures and safety 
culture, years for updating equipment, decades for design of plant. This is in contrast to the 
rate of adaptation in markets and computer-based trading in particular. 
• There is a need to get the best balance between reliable automation and human analysis and 
adaptation. This is a sophisticated topic but in brief the design needs to play to humans’ 
strengths of understanding and adaptation. 
• In safety engineering there are examples where introducing safety or protection measures 
can change people’s behaviour so that the anticipated safety improvements are not as 
envisaged. The complex systems nature of markets means that adaptation could be a 
significant future issue in designing control and protection especially as these might provide 
unintended opportunities for new forms of regulatory arbitrage or market abuse. 
Trust in computer based systems 
Computer based systems, and ICT in general, are of course essential for high-frequency 
trading and for algorithmic trading more broadly: for market participants to process information, 
design trading strategies, and execute the trades; for operators of trading venues and 
regulators to collect and process the data for monitoring and market surveillance and for 
operators to provide protection and intervention via so-called circuit breakers. In all cases, 
systems will need to be sufficiently trusted: how do we describe that level of trust and how is 
this evaluated? 
In the nuclear sector the reactor protection system is crucially dependent on software and 
complex electronics. In the UK nuclear industry, the justification is based on two important 
safety principles: the need for “production excellence” and independent “confidence building”. 
The resulting assurance approach could be summarised as “Do everything and do it at least 
twice”. The specific technical measures that are used to achieve assurance are: 
● The use of a very careful development lifecycle with trusted tools and extensive 
verification and validation; 
● The independent static analysis and mathematical proof of the software with respect to its 
specification and known vulnerability classes; 
● The use of statistical testing to simulate live operation; 
● The challenging of the system with negative testing designed to abuse and misuse the system 
and 
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● The compliance with appropriate standards. 
These approaches are deployed on protection systems and adjusted depending on the 
criticality of the system or component that is being assured. 
In general, the functionality and trust required from a protection system depends on the quality 
of the system that it is protecting and the consequences of failure and spurious activation. In 
the nuclear example, plant design and siting is used to reduce the exogenous and endogenous 
hazards. For the latter, redundancy (that is using replicated components) and defence in depth 
(realised by multiple independent barriers) is used to ensure that single failures, or anticipated 
frequent failures of components, do not lead to costly challenges on the protection system or to 
needing higher levels of trust than necessary. 
In the context of market protection and computer based trading, similar considerations and 
trade-offs might apply. At one extreme one could have trading constrained in such a way that 
there is no need for any additional protection (akin to having intrinsic safety in engineered 
systems) and at the other, an unconstrained approach where there was fast, trusted and 
powerful protection that enabled complete freedom for the trading approaches (somewhat 
analogous to unstable aircraft where they can only be flown with continuous computer based 
control). 
In practice one suspects a balanced strategy would be required and indeed a different strategy 
for different types of hazard. How to decide on a particular approach is outside the scope of 
this paper, but it illustrates that there is close coupling between: 
• How much trust we need in the trading algorithms and platforms; 
• How much trust is needed in any protection mechanisms (whether automated or procedural). 
As we are concerned with systemic risk, it is likely that different approaches will be required for: 
• Single instances of algorithms; 
• Collective behaviour across algorithms/participants and 
• Cross platform/venue behaviour. 
So we could imagine an approach under which the market and venues should be able to 
tolerate a single rogue algorithm. In addition some as yet un-designed protection could be 
deployed against hazardous collective behaviours with measures taken to address correlated 
and cascade failures across markets/venues. Together, these approaches would be shown to 
present tolerable systemic risks. 
If such an approach was adopted then one could foresee trust requirements being articulated 
for the computer-based trading and the protection systems. These would differ from the nuclear 
example in: 
• The speed of response and functionality of the protection; 
• The trust needed in the protection; 
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• The nature and assurance of the trading algorithms. 
The latter concern the rapid rate of adaptation of the algorithms, the development lifecycles, 
the emphasis on rapid prototyping and back testing to gain assurance, and the risk 
management via gradual introduction into service. The dependability properties of the algorithm 
may be very different from the overall functionality e.g. some high confidence in lack of extreme 
behavior. 
Overall conclusions 
The nuclear industry and finance industries may seem worlds apart. A nuclear plant relies on 
decades of science based engineering, the plant is static, physically identifiable, remotely 
located, each reactor owned and licensed to a single operator with strong incentives to ensure 
safety and to ensure the remaining risks are tolerable. 
The finance industry relies on centuries-old risk concepts, yet is fluid, innovative, and fast 
changing. Risk taking is an intrinsic part of its day-to-day functioning. Diversity abounds, both in 
terms of market participants and infrastructure providers. Competition between participants and 
infrastructure providers drives both innovation and risk taking. Technology allows participants 
to be present in multiple venues at once. 
Yet this industry too is concerned with safety and systemic risk mitigation as well as its impact 
on the broader economy. Both market participants and infrastructure providers have incentives 
to ensure the system is robust and inspires confidence. And as described in [Foresight (2011)], 
the increase of computer-based trading has created new challenges for the industry. These 
relate to the understanding of the interaction between human traders and computer algorithms 
(see also [Foresight (2011), DR13], the implications for systemic risk and the development of 
new risk controls for use by both market participants and infrastructure providers. 
In this paper, we have focused on three areas where the issues and practices in the nuclear 
industry resonate with those raised by the evolution of computer-based trading in financial 
markets. These are: 
• The approaches to systemic risk definition and evaluation. 
• The defintion of protection system parameters, risk controls and architecture. 
• The need for trust in computer-based systems. 
The paper is written for the Foresight project and is constrained to not develop policy 
recommendations. However, we have identified a number of key questions that we think 
capture the findings of this study and that could inform future discussions. 
Approaches to systemic risk 
Looking ahead, one could question whether the rapid development of computer-based trading 
in financial markets requires the adoption of additional risk concepts and tools. Our analysis 
suggests that the following questions are worth asking: 
1. Is it possible to have a more precise description of risk categories (e.g. in terms of the 
type of consequences, who is affected, the initiating events that precipitated them)? 
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2. Is it possible to define precise tolerability criteria? Can one distinguish between tolerable 
and broadly acceptable risks? 
3. Is it possible to define numerical targets? If not, how does one define ‘acceptable’ risk? 
4. Is it possible to develop the notion of a ‘design basis,’ which would characterise those 
adverse endogenous and exogenous events that the system (i.e. the market with its 
control and protective mechanisms in place) should withstand? 
Protection systems 
In other Foresight reviews (Foresight (2011) DR4) it is agued that financial markets have 
become complex adaptive systems, in which extreme events can occur in unexpected ways 
Moreover, as financial markets have become increasingly interconnected, they can be viewed 
as ‘systems of systems.’ This means that a failure in one or more constituent parts (market 
venues) could have widespread repercussions. It also implies that system-level failure is 
difficult to predict, not only because both humans and computers can adapt their behaviour 
over time (and can do so at high speed), but also because of the sheer number of possible 
interactions between humans and computers, both within and across venues. These 
complexities make it worth asking whether the concept of a protection or viability envelope 
would be helpful and at the same time these complexities add enormously to the challenge of 
designing and validating such an approach. We have identified the following specific questions 
to help articulate these issues: 
1. What would the protection and control envelopes look like? 
2. What would be the parameters that need to be measured and what would we infer from 
them? How are they related to existing controls such as price limits or circuit breakers? 
3. What would the availability and reliability requirement be for such a system e.g. the 
probability of failure on demand, the frequency of spurious activation? 
4. What is the balance between automation and operator recovery? 
5. What additional understanding (and research) is needed given the complex adaptive 
systems nature of markets? How would the markets adapt to having such protection? 
6. What additional analysis techniques and data are needed to assess the risks arising from 
correlated failures and to design risk controls to guard against their impact? 
The questions raised could be useful in further exploring the challenge of developing viability 
envelopes and designing protection systems. 
Computer assurance 
Computer based systems, and ICT in general, are of course essential for high-frequency 
trading and for algorithmic trading more broadly. In all cases, systems will need to be 
sufficiently trusted: how do we describe that level of trust and how is this evaluated? 
Our comparison with the nuclear sector leads to the following questions: 
1. What would be the advantages/disadvantages of having an explicit assessment of the 
trust needed in computer-based systems and prospective protection and control 
measures? 
2. What are the trade-offs between providing protection mechanisms at a venue level vs 
those on individual users of algorithms? 
3. What different levels of trust for individual, collective and cross-market behaviours are 
required? 
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4. What software engineering techniques would be appropriate to assure future algorithmic 
systems? 
Our analysis in this paper underlines the importance of trust in computer-based systems. The 
questions outlined above may be helpful in exploring this topic in the context of financial 
markets and to assess whether it would be worthwhile to use some of the nuclear assurance 
strategies and techniques as a basis for innovative approaches in the financial sector. 
And finally, although both industries are so different in terms of the culture, technology, 
regulation, incentives, geography, history, rate of evolution, and their fundamental purpose, the 
fact that they both focus on societal significant systemic risks has provided the authors with a 
stimulating perspective on how risks might be evaluated, controlled and communicated in the 
future. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial markets have evolved to become complex adaptive systems highly reliant on the 
communication speeds and processing power afforded by digital systems. Their failure could 
cause severe disruption to the provision of financial services and possibly the wider economy 
and in this study we consider whether a perspective from the nuclear industry can provide 
additional insights. 
In fact there are a very wide range of areas where the issues and practices in the nuclear 
industry might resonate with those raised by the evolution of computer-based trading and in 
this report we focus on: 
• The approaches to systemic risk definition and evaluation 
• The defintion of protection system parameters, risk controls and architecture 
• The need for trust in computer-based systems 
The development of the nuclear industry approach to safety has been driven by the need to 
engineer systems that provide social and economic benefits with tolerable risks, to evaluate 
and explain the nature and extent of these risks and to provide a framework that allows for 
scrutiny at varying levels of independence ranging from technical experts within the industry to 
pressure groups and those who, quite legitimately, hold very different values and worldviews. 
The Public Inquiry in the 1980s into the Sizewell B PWR provided an unprecedented impetus to 
articulate and communicate the industry’s approach and to provide for public debate of societal 
risks. More recently the Generic Design Assessment of the proposed new Nuclear Build in the 
UK has also provided considerable information in the public domain. The regulation and 
approach of the industry has been strongly shaped by the accidents at Windscale, Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl and will be by the events at Fukushima. 
The paper is organised in a straightforward manner: the approaches to systemic risk definition 
and evaluation are addressed in Section 2; the defintion of protection system parameters, risk 
controls and architecture in Section 3; and the need for trust in computer-based systems in 
Section 4. Section 5 brings together the key issues and questions that the study raises. We 
also provide in the Appendices some background material and glossary of terms: they are 
underlined on first use if they are in the glossary. When referring to the ‘nuclear industry’ or the 
‘finance industry’, we include authorities, academics and industry participants. 
The paper is written for the Foresight project and is constrained to not develop policy 
recommendations. Furthermore the views expressed in this paper are not those of the Bank of 
England but the personal views of Dr Anne Wetherilt. 
2. Approaches to systemic risk 
2.1. Introduction 
In this section we examine a number of basic questions: how are the overall risks from a 
nuclear plant defined and evaluated, and how does this compare with financial markets. 
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We consider a serious nuclear incident that has the potential for the release of radioactivity with 
associated plant damage as a “systemic event” and hence make the link to a financial market 
crash: an event in market that both damages the market and also potentially impacts the wider 
financial system and the broader economy. 
2.2. Nuclear sector 
2.2.1 Background 
A typical nuclear power station is shown schematically in Figure 1 (Areva 2011). Heat 
generated from nuclear fission in the reactor core is captured and used to generate steam that 
drives a turbine - a large piece of rotating machinery. The turbine then drives a generator that 
produces electricity that feeds into the grid. 
Figure 1. Overview of nuclear plant 
 
The nuclear fuel is encased in fuel rods within the reactor core. The reactor core itself is within 
a thick steel pressure vessel and the overall reactor is isolated from the environment by a 
number of layers of containment building. 
During normal operation automated computer based control systems and operator action 
maintain the plant in an optimal state. When things go wrong either due to events internal to 
the plant such as pump failure or operator error or due to external events such as earthquakes 
the reactor protection systems operate to shut the plant down. The initial part of the shut down 
would normally involve insertion of control rods into the reactor core to stop the nuclear 
reaction and associated heat generation. Heat generation can persist for some time and in 
practice operating the plant into a stable shut down state can be quite a complex operation 
involving a variety of engineered systems. If the plant is damaged then this can be hard to 
achieve as was seen at Fukushima. Reactor types vary in how easily they are to control and 
shut down. 
Shutting the plant down and reaching a safe state involves a judicious blend of automation and 
manual intervention. Where reliable and rapid protective action is required, automatic initiation 
is required. Where the requirements are less demanding or on a longer timescale, human 
operator actions or administrative control complement the engineered systems. The UK PWR 
at Sizewell is designed so that no human intervention is required for the first 30 minutes after 
the protection system has been activated but that subsequently in an accident situation a range 
of operator and other expert interaction is anticipated. The balance of automation and control is 
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much studied and a very important one to get right: on the one hand humans can be the source 
of error on the other hand their adaptability is essential to deal with unexpected or complex 
situations, especially in the diagnosis of the problems and the planning of the recovery. 
At an abstract level reactor protection systems are quite simple: signals are measured, they are 
compared to defined limits either directly or after varying degrees of computation, and a 
decision is made to shut the plant down by dropping rods into the reactor core. Reactor 
protection systems have to work when needed: they have very high availability and reliability 
requirements. To achieve this, the architecture incorporates segregation, redundancy and 
diversity
Figure 2. Simplified protection system architecture 
. This is shown schematically in Figure 2. 
For many, the potential for societal consequences of a severe nuclear accident suggests that 
the requirements for nuclear reactor protection systems are very onerous. However, from the 
point of view of risk based criteria, the use of diversity, defence in depth
 
 and the infrequent 
demands on the systems means that in the UK the Primary protection systems have had 
requirements for a probability of failure on demand of 10-3 to 10-4. It is difficult to compare these 
figures directly with devices that have to continuously operate but it is generally accepted that 
these computer-based probabilistic requirements are modest when compared with those 
claimed for other safety critical systems (e.g. in avionics and defence applications). 
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Protection systems are designed to have such authority that they override anything else that is 
going on in order to force a shutdown of the reactor. This authority means they can also be a 
source of spurious plant disturbances if they operate when not needed, with consequential 
economic costs and safety implications. There is a need to define performance measures for 
spurious activation (e.g. once every 10 years) as well as failures per demand. 
The control and protection systems rely on the plant being designed and maintained to support 
safety. The state of the plant needs to be able to be assessed (e.g. cracks in pressure vessels 
of critical sizes detected, growth in cracks understood, the idea that systems should leak before 
break) and again there is much science and engineering devoted to understanding these 
phenomena sufficiently well to trust the plant e.g. in the integrity of the pressure vessel. 
Furthermore, the success of the technical systems in preventing accidents, or mitigating those 
that do occur, is achieved in conjunction with people within a specific organisational and 
company setting. The wider socio-technical system is responsible for providing leadership, 
learning from experience and the supporting safety culture. 
The nuclear industry in the UK does not claim that nuclear power is zero risk or perfectly safe. 
Instead there is a framework and supporting evidence that supports a debate on whether the 
risks associated with the technology are tolerable. Some of this framework is summarised in 
the following sections in which we explain the basic concepts used in nuclear safety analysis in 
more detail. 
2.2.2 Basic concepts – hazard, risk, accident 
Nuclear safety analysis is based on the concepts of hazard, risk and accident. 
“Hazard
So hazard contains the idea of inherent danger, such as in a source of energy or toxicity, as 
well as a state or “disposition”. It is sometimes clearer to qualify the term hazard to clarify this 
usage i.e. whether it refers to a state of the system or an intrinsic property. 
 is the potential for harm from an intrinsic property or disposition of something that 
can cause detriment...” 
Both endogenous and exogenous events are considered. 
External hazards are those natural or man-made hazards to a site and facilities that originate 
externally to both the site and the process, i.e. the dutyholder
Internal hazards are those hazards to plant and structures that originate within the site 
boundary and over which the dutyholder has control over the initiating event in some 
form. 
 may have very little or no control 
over the initiating event. 
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Table 1. Examples of internal and external hazards 
External Hazards Internal Hazards 
Earthquake, aircraft impact, 
extreme weather, 
electromagnetic interference 
(off-site cause) and flooding 
as a result of extreme 
weather/climate change, 
terrorist or other malicious 
acts  
Internal flooding, fire, toxic 
gas release, dropped loads, 
explosion and resulting 
debris. 
 
The Health and Safety Executive1
Risk is the chance that someone or something is adversely affected in a particular 
manner by a hazard. 
’s (HSE) publication “Reducing risk, protecting people: HSE’s 
decision making process” (known as R2P2) is an authoritative source for safety concepts and 
policy. It built on earlier work on “The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations” (HSE 
1992) and it defines risk as 
The HSE Nuclear Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) (HSE 2006) use the same definition. 
The important point to note is that a risk evaluation has to take into account both the severity 
and probability of the event. In the context of risks relating to the operation of a nuclear power 
station, the risks of greatest interest are those associated with radiation; both to individuals and 
to society: 
● The risk to individuals: this concerns the risk to the health of any particular individual, 
worker or member of the public. In this case, the harm may be either in the form of “early 
effects” or “late effects”. Early effects will occur if the radiation dosage is very high, received in 
a short time and can result in direct death. With regards to late effects, the greatest concern is 
cancer. 
● The risk to society: societal risks are those that are wider than those to individuals, 
having consequences to environment and infrastructure such as loss of electricity and 
economic loss and were they to materialise, could provoke a socio-political response. For 
instance, in the case of the Chernobyl disaster, apart from the individuals that died or were 
affected by the fall-out, there were significant effects to the environment and consequently to 
the food chain, not only locally but also internationally. 
The term accident is also defined and has a meaning close to its general usage 
                                            
1 The HSE is the UK’s independent health and safety regulator. Its responsibilities for nuclear safety now reside with 
the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).  
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‘accident’
Accidents are classified according to an international scale – the International Nuclear and 
radiological Event Scale (INES) – that considers the off-site effects, on-site effects, and the 
impact on the defence in depth. There is also the concept in the SAPs of a 
 includes any undesired circumstances which give rise to ill health or injury; 
damage to property, plant, products or the environment; production losses or increased 
liabilities. 
severe accident
To sum up, the nuclear industry safety analysis is based on the concepts of hazard – the 
potential for harm – as well as the consequences of that potential manifesting itself in an 
accident. Where possible hazards are removed but if this not possible the decision making, all 
things being equal, is based not only on the potential consequence but also the likelihood of 
that consequence. The consequence and probability are combined in the risk. 
 in 
which the highest radiological doses exceed certain targets or unintended relocation of 
radioactive material within the facility that places a demand on the integrity of the remaining 
physical barriers. As noted earlier we consider a serious incident that has the potential for the 
release of radioactivity with associated plant damage a “systemic event”, in INES levels this 
would be a Serious Incident of severity level 3 and above. 
In this paper we use the term systemic to refer to the potential for the release of radioactivity 
with associated plant damage. Systemic risk, in nuclear terminology, refer both to the 
consequence and probability of such events. 
Having established what we mean by systemic risk the next questions to address are how this 
is evaluated and how we use this in decision-making. 
2.2.3 Probabilistic safety analysis and design basis 
The prediction of future risks cannot be extrapolated directly from historic data as there is, 
thankfully, a lack of data. Instead empirical evidence is combined with imagined scenarios 
supported with extensive scientific modelling to establish both qualitative descriptions of the 
risk as well as probabilistic values. Even where there is empirical data (e.g. on large 
earthquake or flood levels) the risk assessment will rely on models to establish plausible 
extreme values and their associated probabilities. As with all risk assessments of low 
probability/high impact events there is considerable use of subjective expert opinion. A major 
outcome of the risk assessments is an improved understanding of the plant behaviour and the 
interdependencies and tradeoffs that have been made. 
The nuclear safety analysis uses a formal framework for describing the assumptions and 
scenarios that are considered. Initiating faults are identified that may challenge the safety via a 
consequential fault sequence. These consider both internal failures such as disintegration of 
turbine blades or operator error as well as external events such as earthquakes. The analysis 
is simplified by the consideration of bounding cases that represent extreme consequences and 
the simplification of the number of accidents that need to be considered by the use of accident 
classes. The safety analyses of the design justifies that taking a conservative view of the 
initiating faults (in terms of frequency and size), together with bounding scenarios for the 
propagation of the event into a class of accidents, provides an overall conservative result. The 
range of conditions and events that the plant is explicitly designed to withstand without 
exceeding safety limits are known as the Design Basis
 
. 
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The safety analyses are supported by Probabilistic Safety Analyses (PSA) that seek to 
establish the probability of a certain undesirable events which, when combined with knowledge 
of the potential consequences, allows the risks of nuclear accidents to be calculated. It 
proceeds by a mixture of top down analysis (e.g. using a Fault Tree to analyse “how can this 
pipe break”) as well as bottom up that takes the occurrence of a hazard and seeks to trace the 
consequences (e.g. using Event Tree analysis to assess what happens if “this control system 
fails”). It requires a comprehensive analysis of the overall plant design and operation together 
with detailed evaluation of failure modes of components and their probabilities. It covers all 
initiating faults that are in the design basis. It is performed using best-estimate methods and 
data to demonstrate the acceptability, or otherwise, of the plant risk. The PSA also seeks to 
demonstrate that a balanced design has been achieved. This means that no particular class of 
accident of the plant makes a disproportionate contribution to the overall risk e.g. of the order 
of one tenth or greater. The PSA provides information on the reliability, maintenance and 
testing requirements for the safety systems and the rigour required of operating procedures. 
The PSA provides a means of claiming that the risk is lower than the intolerable region 
established by the SAPs (see also Figure 3). The PSA can then be used to demonstrate that 
risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable by investigating the effect on plant risk of 
modifying the plant safety provisions. Another important role of the PSA is to establish how 
much trust needs to be placed in the functions that the various safety systems perform (e.g. in 
terms of the Safety Category and the probability of failure on demand) and their allocation to 
the different safety systems. 
The output from the safety analyses is summarised in a Fault and Protection Schedule that 
details for each fault sequence in the Design Basis the impact on the plant and how it will be 
protected and mitigated. A simplified example is provided in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Nuclear fault and protection schedule 
Simplified Fault and Protection Schedule (excerpt) 
  Functional Level Equipment Equipment 
Fa
ul
t 
de
sc
rip
ti
on
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y S
af
et
y 
Fu
nc
tio
n Pl
an
t 
Le
ve
l 
C
at
 
Pr
im
ar
y 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
Sy
st
em
 
C
la
ss
 
Se
co
nd
a
ry
 
(d
iv
er
se
) 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
Sy
st
em
 
C
la
ss
 
         
Partia
l loss 
of 
coola
nt 
flow 
10-3 
to 
10-4 
Reacti
vity 
Contr
ol 
Shut 
down 
and 
maintai
n core 
sub-
criticalit
y 
A Reactor trip 
on low flow 
rate in one 
loop 
1 High 
pressure 
Boron 
injection on 
ATWS signal 
2 
  Heat 
Remo
val 
Transfe
r heat 
from 
the 
reactor 
coolant 
to the 
ultimate 
heat 
sink 
 
A Steam 
generator 
and 
emergency 
feedwater 
control 
1 Heat removal 
by 
Emergency 
Core Cooling 
System 
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2 
The above table provides an example of a summary Fault and Protection Schedule. 
The first column describes the type of accident that in this example is a partial loss 
of coolant flow. This requires two types of safety function, the first to control the 
reactivity of the core and the amount of heat being produced and the second a 
safety function to remove the heat from the core. These functions are classed as 
Category A – the highest safety category. The next part of the table summarises 
the equipment that will implement these Safety Functions. There is a Primary 
Protection System that will drop the rods in to the core and control the turbine and 
feedwater so as to continue to extract heat. If this Primary System fails, the diverse 
Secondary Protection System detects this condition (known as ATWS – Anticipated 
Transient Without Scram) and uses a diverse method of controlling the reactivity via 
injecting boron. It also activates a different Emergency Core Cooling System. The 
Secondary System has a lower safety class as it is only needed when the Primary 
System fails. 
In an actual Fault Schedule there will be additional details of the protection 
functions and cross-references to the safety analysis and other faults as well as 
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details of the plant state when the accident occurs.  
 
However, there are some aspects of safety that the SAPs recognise as not readily amenable to 
simple quantification of failure. The role of human factors (at an individual, group and 
organisational level) in achieving safety and initiating accidents is hard to quantify meaningfully, 
especially when knowledge based activities are concerned. Similarly the contribution of good 
management practices is hard to assess, although research and some progress has been 
made in this area. Other areas identified that are difficult to quantify, are common mode
In dealing with the necessary uncertainties and incompleteness in nuclear system analyses it is 
useful to distinguish between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties (Oberkampf (2004), 
Littlewood (2010)). Epistemic uncertainty concerns incompleteness in our knowledge about the 
world e.g. in the models and reasoning that we use to estimate and predict reliability. Epistemic 
uncertainty is in principle reducible, e.g. by collecting more and better evidence concerning the 
subject of the uncertainty. There is also uncertainty associated with what we see as random 
processes in the world: quite when will a component fail, when will it rain. This is “uncertainty in 
the world” and is irreducible
 failures 
and failures due to design faults or specification omissions including software faults. 
2
The existence of a formal framework for nuclear safety analysis does not of course guarantee 
that it will be applied appropriately or that epistemic uncertainties will be properly addressed. 
Although there are significant differences in how safety is assessed in the UK and Japan, the 
recent accident at Fukushima should reinforce our scepticism and emphasise further the need 
for challenge and continuous review of safety analyses. The appreciation of the risks from 
tsunamis and earthquakes is deeply embedded in the culture (and art) of Japan. Yet, the 
apparent shortcomings in Fukushima’s risk controls remind us that constant vigilance is 
required in order to ensure that there are no significant ‘blind spots’ in an industry’s thinking 
about systemic risk
. One consequence of the recognition of epistemic uncertainties is 
in the use of claim limits to prevent unreasonable low figures being claimed for the probability 
of failure of sub-systems (IAEA (2000), HSE (2006)). While it is very hard to justify the limits 
chosen the concept is appealing. 
3
2.2.4 Tolerability of risk and ALARP
. 
4
The overall approach to safety and risk evaluation in the nuclear industry in the UK is described 
in the HSE Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) (HSE 2006). These are the primary principles 
that define the overall approach to be followed and are consistent with international guidance 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency and are supported by more detailed Technical 
Assessment Guides (TAGs) and other guidance documents. The SAPs are based on eight 
 
                                            
2 The term comes from aleator – a dice player. 
3 See also possible problems from normalization of deviance as discussed in Foresight (2011). 
4 This section is based on a report for the UK Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee (Littlewood (1998)) The HSE 
provides additional detail on the definition and interpretation of ALARP in (HSE (2010)). 
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fundamental principles that address, responsibility, leadership, understanding, fairness, inter-
generational issues, protection, recovery and mitigation. 
It is important to note that the Principles explain what has to be done, but do not become 
prescriptive as to how these requirements will be met: they reflect a goal-based approach to 
regulation. They provide flexibility to the duty holder to achieve what is expected by the SAPs. 
It is then a matter for the safety case to demonstrate adherence to the SAPs. In Section 4 we 
discuss the application of these principles to computer-based system. 
The risks to workers and the population at large are considered both in normal operation of 
nuclear installations and in accident conditions and have to be reduced to a level of 
“tolerability
The “
”. Tolerability does not mean “acceptability”—it refers to a willingness to live with a 
risk to yield certain benefits so long as there is confidence that it is properly controlled. The 
design of nuclear installations and their supporting safety systems focuses on minimizing and 
controlling risks. Cost and rigour of activities must be proportionate to those risks. Calculations 
of risk, taking into account severity and likelihood, have to then demonstrate that the risk is 
appropriately mitigated to a tolerable level. 
ALARP
ALARP found its expression in the well known ‘carrot diagram’ (see 
 principle”: the principle that certain nuclear risks have to be demonstrated to be 
“As Low As Reasonably Practicable” is key to discussing risks and the stopping rules 
associated with additional design and operational measures. The ALARP principle is based on 
the assumption that it is possible to compare marginal improvements in safety (marginal risk 
decreases) with the marginal costs of the risk reduction measures. Nuclear risks may offer this 
possibility when they are quantified (i.e. in terms of event probability and of radiation releases), 
and when the failure rate improvements of the systems controlling the relevant events can be 
evaluated. Note that the application of the ALARP concept does not necessarily need a 
quantification of risk reduction. For example, the simple addition of a further safety feature, 
which costs relatively little, may be obviously worthwhile—qualitative judgements of this nature 
can often be readily made. Also, marginal does not mean one just considers incremental or 
small perturbations to the design: sometimes creative design changes (e.g. substitution of 
hazardous materials with benign ones) are needed to justify that the risks have been reduced 
to ALARP. 
Figure 3 below), which has 
become the standard means for the exposition of the principle. There are two significant 
boundaries: the upper one beyond which risks are not acceptable at all and cannot be justified 
on any grounds and a lower one beyond which risks are considered negligible and no detailed 
assessment is required. Regulators would not usually require further action to reduce risks 
unless reasonably practicable measures are available. Within these two boundaries is the 
ALARP region. At the upper, more risky end, of the ALARP region the risks are only tolerable if 
costs are judged grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction gained. 
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Figure 3. The ALARP principle: levels of risk are divided into three bands. Width of 
wedge represents level of risk. 
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A key part of assessing tolerability is the effective communication of safety and risk. The 
nuclear industry, in keeping with other high hazard sectors, uses the concept of a safety case 
to facilitate this. 
2.2.5 Safety cases 
The nuclear safety case is defined by the HSE as 
“…the totality of documented information and arguments which substantiates the safety of 
the plant, activity, operation or modification in question. It provides a written 
demonstration that relevant standards have been met and that risks have been reduced 
as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).” 
The licensee
● Reasoning and argumentation. A safety case can be seen as an over-arching framework that 
allows us to argue whether the claims are substantiated by the evidence. The case might be 
mainly narrative, using prose to explain the connections between claims and evidence. 
However cases deal with highly technical subjects and hence they might use specialist 
notations from the particular discipline concerned (e.g. from fluid mechanics, computer 
science). The case will then integrate a selection of technical analyses and other evidence 
 is legally responsible for the safety case. Given the magnitude and complexity of 
the legislative and technical requirements that have to be met, safety cases have to be 
structured in a logical manner and be demonstrably adequate. The safety case has to support 
an argument that the requirements placed upon it are met. As such, the safety case contains 
claims about the properties of the system and, following a systematic approach, demonstrates 
that these claims are substantiated by evidence (see Box 2). Safety cases can be seen to 
support the following (Bishop 2010): 
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using a formal or graphical notation to show whether the claims have been met; how the 
evidence is integrated; and the overall structure of the case and the thrust of the argument. 
● Negotiation, communication, trust. The safety case represents a boundary object between 
the different stakeholders who have to agree (or not) the claims being made about the 
system. To this end it has to be detailed and rigorous enough to effectively communicate the 
case and allow challenges and the subsequent deepening of the case. 
Box 2. Safety and assurance cases: claims, arguments, evidence 
A system safety case is now a requirement in many safety standards and regulations. Explicit 
safety cases are required for military systems, the off shore oil industry, rail transport and the 
nuclear industry. An early definition of a safety case (Bloomfield 1998) was 
“a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a 
system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment”. 
More recent definitions make explicit the concept of structured argumentation 
“A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, 
comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given 
environment” 
Current safety case practice makes use of the basic approach that can be related to the 
concepts developed by (Toulmin 1958) where claims are supported by evidence and a 
“warrant” or argument that links the evidence to the claim. There are variants of this basic 
approach that present the claim structure graphically such as Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) (Kelly 2004) or Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) (Bloomfield 1998). 
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As noted in Section 2.2.1 defence in depth is an important principle so that there is not over 
reliance on any single system. There is an analogous approach within the safety case in 
which diverse arguments and evidence are used to support key claims. These arguments are 
sometimes called the ‘legs’ of the safety case and are based on different evidence. Another 
important feature of the safety case process is independent assessment: both within the 
organisation responsible for it as well as by the regulator. Safety case reports are produced 
that provide sufficient detail of the claims, arguments and evidence to enable this 
independent review. A nuclear plant has many subsystems and the safety documentation will 
be a series of linked cases for different aspects of the plant and its operation. The objective 
of independent assessment is to ensure that more than one person or team sees the 
evidence so as to overcome possible conflicts of interest and blinkered views that may arise 
from a single assessment. 
Although the nuclear industry was instrumental in establishing the need for safety cases, the 
incorporation of software safety case requirements in the UK defence standards helped drive 
interest in structured safety cases, and other forms of assurance case. The UK Civil Aviation 
Authority has a goal based software regulation and more recently the FDA in the US has 
required Assurance Cases to be developed for medical infusion pumps. There is an 
international standard ISO/IEC 50126 on the basic concepts and work within the OMG on 
standardisation of interchange formats. 
 
2.2.6 Numerical targets 
A significant aspect of the nuclear safety approach is the role of numerical, probabilistic, 
targets. The individual risk of death levels in “Reducing risk, protecting people: HSE’s decision 
making process” (HSE 2001) cover risks to workers and to members of the public from 
activities on the site and are summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Numerical risk targets for workers and the public 
Boundary  
Boundary between the ‘tolerable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ regions for risk 
entailing fatality 
Worker: 1 in 1,000 pa  
Member of the public: 1 in 10,000 pa  
Boundary between the ‘broadly 
acceptable’ and ‘tolerable’ regions for 
risk entailing fatality 
Worker: 1 in 1,000,000 pa  
Member of the public: 1 in 1,000,000 pa”. 
 
There is also a consideration in the safety analysis of societal risks arising from severe but very 
unlikely accidents. The SAPs note that the nature of radioactive release from a major accident 
at a nuclear site will mean that long term, large distance stochastic effects are important. As a 
measure of the societal concerns that would result from a major accident, a representative 
target has been defined based on an accident leading to an immediate or eventual 100 or more 
fatalities. The target does not cover all the factors related to societal concerns so that in making 
an ALARP argument other societal effects
The distinction between societal effects, risk and concerns is explained in Table 3. 
 must also be considered. 
Table 3. Concerns, effects and risks 
 Definition 
Societal 
concerns 
 
Societal concerns are the risks or threats from 
hazards which impact on society and which, if 
realised, could have adverse repercussions for the 
institutions responsible for putting in place the 
provisions and arrangements for protecting people.  
Societal 
effects 
 
A term used to describe those societal concerns that 
are capable of quantitative prediction such as 
numbers of deaths or injuries, numbers of people 
evacuated, area of land contaminated and general 
economic loss. 
Societal risk 
 
The risk of an accident causing the death of a 
specified number of people in a single event from a 
single major industrial activity, i.e. an activity from 
which risk is assessed as a whole and is under the 
control of one company in one location, or within a 
site boundary. 
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Table 4. Target for total risk of 100 or more fatalities  
The targets for the total risk of 100 or more fatalities, 
either immediate or eventual, from on-site accidents  
Basic Safety Level (BSL): 1 x 10-5 pa (level that all new 
plant should reach) 
Basic Safety Objective (BSO): 1 x 10-7 pa (boundary of 
broadly acceptable region) 
 
The consequence of normal operation and accidents are studied in detail and the targets are 
set for events that within or on the boundaries of the plant e.g. targets for the frequency of core 
damage due to internal hazards of 10-6p.a. (HSE 2011). 
2.3. Financial markets 
2.3.1 Background 
Financial markets are a key component of the wider financial system
The financial system consists of institutional units and markets that interact, typically in a 
complex manner, for the purpose of mobilizing funds for investment, and providing 
facilities, including payment systems, for the financing of commercial activity (OECD, 
glossary of statistical terms) 
. The OECD defines the 
latter as follows: 
Financial markets
In line with the overall aim of the Foresight project, this paper focuses on those markets that 
are referred to as continuous auctions (Foresight (2011)), with most examples taken from stock 
exchanges. It is in these markets that computerised trading is most prevalent and the widest 
range of algorithms have been developed. Algorithmic trading is growing, however, in other 
auction-type markets, such as FX trading platforms (BIS (2011)). 
 themselves are varied, both in terms of their economic function, and their 
organisational characteristics. 
2.3.2 Basic concepts: market crashes and systemic risk 
This Section starts by defining a number of key concepts. First, in common with the nuclear, 
industry, the finance industry employs key risk concepts: 
Operational risk is defined as the risk that shortcomings in information systems or internal 
processes (including human error) could result in unexpected losses (CPSS (2003)). 
Market risk can be defined as the risk of a change in the value of a portfolio of assets 
arising from changes in the value of the underlying assets. 
Systemic risk is broadly defined as the risks affecting the functioning of the financial 
system as a whole (see Box 3). 
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A market crash
• Market crashes constitute large price falls. For example, on Monday October 19, 1987, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 24%. 
 is an extreme event, whereby prices fall by “very large” amounts. Although 
there is no commonly accepted numerical definition of a market crash, studies of historical 
market crashes reveal the following characteristics: 
• They are a market-wide phenomenon (a large price fall in a single stock does not constitute a 
market crash). 
• They are often triggered by relatively small events. In a much quoted study, Cuttler, Poterba 
and Summers (1989) show that extreme stock price movements rarely coincide with 
significant economic news. In fact, many of the largest price movements in their sample 
occurred on days with no notable news events. 
• They may be relatively short-lived events (e.g. 1987) or they may play out over a longer time 
period (e.g. 1929). 
Very large price falls result in a significant reduction of economic wealth (e.g. the assets held 
by pension funds). But for such large price falls to be considered a systemic event (see box 3), 
a number of characteristics must apply: 
1. The large price fall undermines confidence in the market, so investors withdraw, possibly 
for an extended period. Reduced participation may affect the ability of a financial market 
to fulfil its essential economic functions of price discovery and risk sharing. 
2. The large price fall ‘spills over’ into other markets via so-called contagion effects. Hence, 
a wide range of markets may be impaired in their essential functions. 
3. The large price fall affects the funding decisions of systemically important financial 
institutions.5
Note that there is a link between institutional funding needs and market functioning. A financial 
entity needing to sell assets when prices are falling may find itself in a positive feedback loop: 
the more assets it needs to sell, the greater its contribution to the overall selling pressure, and 
the larger the price fall, the more assets it needs to sell in turn (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009)). This downward spiral is one of the possible characteristics of a systemic price fall. 
 Institutions may find it difficult to raise new funding. Hence, the contagion 
spreads from markets to institutions. 
Note also that while operational and systemic risk are distinct concepts they are not 
independent classes of risk. For example, a technical outage which lead to a halt of trading 
would not be considered a systemic event, unless of course it was accompanied by or led to 
the conditions described in (i) – (iii). At the same time, if market participants had concerns 
about the controls in place to manage operational risk (either at the level of a venue or its 
participants), then they may be less inclined to trade, thus reducing liquidity in a given venue, 
and affecting its ability to function as noted above. 
                                            
5 FSB (2009) defines a systemically-important institution as financial institutions which provide critical functions in 
the financial system (p. 6). 
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Box 3. Defining financial stability and systemic risk 
Definitions of financial stability vary: some refer in broad terms to safeguarding the core 
functions of the financial system; others emphasise the occurrence of specific financial crisis 
events. As an example of the former, Haldane et al (2004) define financial instability as ‘the 
deviation from the optimal saving-investment plan of an economy that is due to imperfections 
in the financial sector.’ Tucker (2011) states ‘financial stability prevails where the financial 
system is sufficiently resilient that worries about bad states of the world do not affect 
confidence in the ability of the system to deliver its core services to the rest of the economy.’ 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB,(2009)) defines a systemic event as a ‘disruption to the 
flow of financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial 
system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy.’ The FSB further outlines three broad criteria to assess systemic importance 
(which apply both to financial institutions and financial markets): 
• Size (which captures the amount of financial services provided); 
• Lack of substitutability; 
• Interconnectedness (which captures both direct and indirect interlinkages) 
When applying these criteria to financial markets, FSB (2009) notes that it is difficult to 
assess their systemic importance independently, as this depends on the systemic importance 
of institutions that participate in these markets. Moreover, financial markets are often 
characterised by network effects, which effectively concentrate trading, thereby increasing 
the size of particular markets and reducing possibilities for substitutability. 
A related concept is systemic risk. The Office of Financial Research (Bsiais et al (2012)) 
defines systemic risk as ‘any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public 
confidence in the financial system.’ IMF (2010) defines systemic risk as ‘the large losses to 
other financial institutions induced by the failure of a particular institution due to its 
interconnectedness.’ 
A more detailed examination of the literature reveals a long list of factors contributing to 
systemic risk, including contagion, asset bubbles, information disruption, feedback 
behaviours, negative externalities etc. (Bsiais et al (2012)). Hence, many studies highlight the 
difficulty of measuring systemic risk: ‘it is there when we see it’ (IMF (2009). Building on the 
substantial literature in this area, Bsiais et al (2012) propose a total of 31 quantitative 
measures of systemic risk. These include measures of financial interlinkages, indicators of 
credit risk, and results of stress testing, to name but a few. 
Apart from concerns about ‘fuzzy measurement,‘ as termed by Borio and Drehman (2009), 
systemic risk metrics often fail to detect financial distress. Borio and Drehman also point out 
that periods of instability may persist for a long time, without a financial distress event 
occurring. 
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When thinking about the sources of systemic risk, one can distinguish between three broad 
scenarios: 
(i) a wide range of institutions and markets being exposed to a common shock; 
(ii) an initially idiosyncratic shock which subsequently spreads to a wider range of institutions 
and markets and 
(iii) the gradual build up of an imbalance such as an asset price or a credit bubble, which 
subsequently unravels and affects a broad range of institutions and markets.6
A further distinction can be made between exogenous and endogenous sources of systemic 
risk. The latter can be defined as the risks attributable to the actions of risk-averse market 
participants.
 
7
Market crashes are not a new phenomenon, as noted above. But there are concerns that the 
widespread use of automated trading strategies may have made financial markets more 
vulnerable to such crashes. In that sense, the May 6 ‘Flash Crash’ is viewed by some as a 
signal of increased market fragility (Foresight (2011)). A key development is that market 
crashes can no longer be attributed to the behaviour of human traders alone. Indeed, it is not 
inconceivable that a market crash could be triggered by a computer algorithm, propagated by 
high-frequency trading, and eventually leading to a series of automated feedback loops 
(Foresight (2011)). 
 For example, market participants may respond to a change in exogenous risk 
by selling assets. But this in turn may lead to sharp asset price falls, thus increasing the 
perceived risk of holding such assets, thereby further increasing endogenous risk. 
So far the discussion has focused on the concept of ‘systemic risk’ in general, and market 
crashes in particular. Related concepts include market integrity and market efficiency. These 
are defined as follows by IOSCO: 
• ‘Market integrity is the extent to which a market operates in a manner that is, and is 
perceived, to be fair and orderly, and where effective rules are in place and enforced by 
regulators so that confidence and participation in the market is fostered’ (IOSCO (2011a), 
p.8). 
• ‘Market efficiency refers to the ability of market participants to transact business easily and at 
a price that reflects all available information. Factors considered when determining if a market 
is efficient include liquidity, price discovery and transparency’ (IOSCO (2011a), p8). 
Another much-used term is ‘orderly’ market,8 or alternatively, the need to avoid a ‘disorderly 
market.’9
                                            
6 See e.g. Schwaab et al (2011). 
 These terms are rarely defined, but generally refer to the absence of large order 
7 See e.g. Danielson et al (2009). 
8 See e.g. FSA (2010), The FSA’s markets regulatory agenda, May. See also ESMA (2011). 
9 See e.g. MiFID, recitals 46 and 48. 
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imbalances, erroneous orders, system overloads, large price swings, or other events that may 
disrupt the trading process. 
Traditionally, securities markets regulators have focused mostly on market integrity. Recent 
amendments to the international guidelines for securities markets regulation, however, 
acknowledge the importance of systemic risk (see Box 4). 
Box 4. Regulation of financial markets  
The international guidelines for securities markets regulation are contained in IOSCO’s 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO (2010)). Their main aim is to 
ensure the integrity of trading by: 
• Requiring that exchanges and trading systems are subject to authorization and 
oversight; 
• Maintaining fair and equitable rules; 
• Promoting transparency; 
• Detecting and deterring market manipulation; 
• Seeking to ensure the proper management of large exposures; 
In July 2010, IOSCO adopted a new principle that acknowledges the need for securities 
regulators to monitor, mitigate and manage systemic risks arising in securities markets, in 
addition to their traditional micro-prudential objectives (listed in the previous paragraph). 
This systemic risk principle covers a wide range of issues that may affect systemic risk, 
including financial innovation, product complexity and interconnectedness (between 
institutions and markets) 
Liquidity features in IOSCO’s earlier-mentioned definition of market efficiency, but is also 
related to systemic risk. A market crash is an instance of extreme illiquidity (see Box 5 for a 
definition and common measures of liquidity). 
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Box 5. Defining and measuring market liquidity 
Definition 
Market liquidity is defined as the ability of a market to process buy and sell orders with 
minimal delay and price impact. In a liquid market: 
(i) buy and sell orders can be matched with minimal delay; 
(ii) buy and sell orders can be matched without requiring significant price concessions from 
either party; 
(iii) buy and sell orders of varying sizes can be processed. 
The concept of market liquidity is often associated with the absence of market frictions. In an 
illiquid market, participant interest may be unbalanced (more sellers than buyers), or it may 
only be possible to process relatively small trade sizes. 
Liquidity is conventionally measured by the bid-ask spread, the difference between the price 
at which a market participant (e.g. a market maker) is willing to buy and the price at which he 
is willing to sell. Bid-ask spreads are narrow when the market is liquid. They widen when 
markets become less liquid, e.g. when there are more sellers than buyers. 
Metrics 
Financial economists have developed a wide range of liquidity metrics that can be used to 
describe a market under stress. Each captures different aspects of market liquidity. The 
choice of metric is often determined by data availability (some use transaction-level data, 
some use data on both prices and trade sizes). 
A few illustrative examples: 
(i) Price impact: based on Kyle (1985), this popular measure is obtained by regressing 
transaction prices on transaction sizes. The price impact coefficient measures the transaction 
volume required to move the price by one unit of price (say one dollar). 
(ii) Order flow toxicity: developed by Easley et al (2011), this measures the presence of 
informed traders in a market. The intuition behind this measure is that uninformed investors 
typically lose money when trading with more informed counterparties, and will reduce their 
trading activity, thus resulting in lower liquidity. 
(iii) Returns on market making: Khandany and Lo (2011) document significant falls in the 
returns on simulated portfolios associated with market making during a period of reduced 
market liquidity. 
Empirical evidence shows that these metrics significantly deteriorate during periods of market 
stress. For a recent summary of such metrics, see Bsiais et al (2012) and Billio et al (2010). 
 
Computer trading and systemic risk: a nuclear perspective 
31 
Two final terms of use are operational resilience, which refers to the operational capacity of a 
trading venue (e.g. whether its systems can cope with sudden surges in transaction volumes), 
and liquidity resilience, which refers to its ability to remain liquid during periods of market 
stress. Both are important objectives in their own right, but as will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 3, are also important mitigants in reducing systemic risk. 
The increased reliance of computer-based systems in financial markets has led some to worry 
abut operational resilience, in particular the massive increase in message traffic, and the 
widespread use of order cancellations. There are also questions about the reliability and impact 
of algorithms (often untested in their interaction with others), and the greater potential for 
erroneous algorithms to disrupt the market (Foresight (2011)). 
Worries about liquidity resilience focus on the specific role of high-frequency traders; whether 
they contribute to liquidity provision, both during normal and stressful market conditions, and 
whether they discourage others from providing liquidity. Some are also concerned about the 
impact of algorithmic trading more broadly on market liquidity (see e.g. Kay (2012)). 
2.3.3 Probabilistic safety analysis – the finance approach 
This and the next Section explain how the finance industry measures and manages the risk 
arising from very large price changes. In this Section we summarise work describing past 
market crashes and how this is used to infer the probability of such crashes occurring in the 
future. We then look, in the following Section, at the models used to measure these risks. 
Much like the nuclear industry, the finance profession has developed a quantitative approach 
towards the measurement of market and systemic risk in general, and market crashes in 
particular. By and large, the profession relies on historical data to measure both the probability 
and the impact of the very large price changes that may constitute a market crash. 
The literature on market crashes is closely related to that on asset price bubbles. A bubble is 
defined as an instance where asset prices deviate for a prolonged period of time from the value 
justified by underlying fundamentals (such as the growth prospects of a company). An asset 
price bust occurs when prices rapidly return to their fundamental value (the bubble bursts), or 
in some cases even fall below levels justified by fundamentals. The consensus in the literature 
is that asset price bubbles and busts are difficult to predict, even though some long-term 
indicators (such as rises in credit availability) are in some instances associated with 
subsequent asset price bursts.10
Some of the work describing historical market crashes is descriptive and looks at the big 
picture – how often crashes occur and what their economic impact is. Bordo (2003) describes 
20 stock market crashes in the US and 17 in the UK, between 1800 and 2000. Barro and Urusa 
(2009) use long-term data (in some cases going back to the 1930s) ending in 2006 and report 
232 stock market crashes in 30 countries. 
 
These studies typically measure the extent of the market crash using low-frequency return 
data. For example, Barro and Ursua (2009) consider the peak-to-trough movement in stock 
returns, with a multi-year return of -25% or lower classified as a market crash. Bordo (2003) 
                                            
10 See e.g. Kannan et al (2009). 
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uses 20% as his cut-off point. Including war periods, Barro and Urusa (2009) report that in 124 
out of 232 stock market crashes the total price fall was greater than 40%, with 79 of those 
greater than 50%. 
When measuring impact, these studies focus on broad economic measures. Indeed, a 
significant number of financial market crises were associated with economic recessions. 
Hence, the fall in economic output (measured by GDP) is frequently used as a measure of the 
cost of a financial crisis. Increased public debt is another measure. Barro and Urusa (2009) use 
the decline in per capita consumer expenditure as their measure of economic recession, and 
find that 71 of the above-mentioned crashes coincided with or were adjacent to economic 
recessions. 
Other studies describe the statistical properties of large price changes at a higher frequency 
(say daily or intraday). A key question is whether price dynamics observed during a market 
crash are fundamentally different from those in normal times (see Box 6). As explained in the 
Box, one approach is to measure the statistical frequency of very large price changes. This 
critically relies on the choice of the frequency distribution for price changes. Alternatively, one 
can develop a non-parametric approach, which does not require such a choice. 
Box 6. Understanding the statistical properties of extreme price movements 
Empirical studies of stock price changes (or returns) show that these are not well described 
by the normal distribution (see e.g. Campbell et al (1996)). In particular, a number of stylised 
facts appear at a range of frequencies (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly, or even intraday): 
(i) Volatility of returns varies over time; 
(ii) Volatility of returns is clustered, i.e. prolonged periods of higher than average volatility are 
observed, as well as periods of lower than average volatility. 
(iii) Return distributions display heavy tails, so very large price changes are more frequent 
than indicated by the normal distribution; 
(iv) Very large price changes tend to cluster. 
Hence, it is commonly accepted that stock price returns can be described more accurately by 
a power law distribution, at least for the earlier-mentioned frequencies. This implies that: 
(i) Both small and large price changes can be expected. In other words, very large price 
changes are not exceptional. 
(ii) Both small and large price changes are drawn from the same distribution. Hence, ex ante 
it is not possible to distinguish between these two types of events. In other words, large price 
changes cannot be predicted. 
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But some studies view very large price changes as extreme occurrences or outliers, which lie 
beyond the fat tail of a power distribution (see e.g. Sornette (2003)). Moreover, these studies 
show that extreme price changes are drawn from a different distribution than those 
describing smaller price changes. It then follows that the extreme events could be more 
frequent than suggested by a power law distribution. 
As an example of non-parametric work, Johanssen and Sornette (2001) measure the 
accumulated loss over a period of consecutive daily price falls. Thus they capture the 
difference between the local maximum (the highest observed price fall) and the local 
minimum (the lowest observed price fall). They refer to this metric as ‘drawdown.’ In other 
words, the drawdown metric quantifies the loss an investor would make if he had bought at 
the most recent maximum price and sold at the next minimum price. The authors find that 
historical market crashes have all been preceded by such a drawdown. They also confirm 
that drawdowns cannot be explained within the power-law framework. 
Sornette’s work further shows that stock market crashes are not isolated events that occur 
very rarely and are entirely unpredictable. Instead, he and others argue that these large price 
falls mark the end of a (sometimes very long) period of instability during which prices rose to 
unsustainable levels (see also Sornette and Johanssen (2001)). 
A separate question is whether the power law distribution adequately describes price 
changes at very high frequencies (e.g. measured over seconds or milliseconds, rather than 
minutes). In recent work, Johnson et al (2012) examine extreme price falls that occur over 
very short time intervals (less than 25 milliseconds) for the period 2006-2011. They find that 
the power-law distribution no longer describes price changes at these frequencies: price 
changes that last about 1 second can be described by a power law, but as the duration falls, 
and arguably human traders can no longer process the data, the distribution ceases to be a 
power law. 
In sum, there is considerable academic evidence that some extreme price movements exhibit 
distinctive statistical properties. Whether and how these might be used to assess future risks is 
very much a research challenge. 
2.3.4 Tolerability of risk, numerical targets & the design basis – the finance approach 
This Section starts by discussing how participants in financial markets measure the risks 
arising from large asset price falls. This is done by looking at methods to measure market risk 
in investor portfolios and the regulatory framework applying to firms participating in financial 
markets. The Section will then look at the approaches towards measuring and evaluating large 
stock price falls from the perspective of the market as a whole. 
Financial market participants use probabilistic methods to quantify the risks arising from large, 
unexpected price falls. This involves assessing the probability of large price falls, measuring 
their impact on asset portfolios and setting risk tolerance levels. In part, individual firms’ risk 
tolerance levels will be determined by regulatory capital requirements. Indeed, for financial 
institutions subject to the Basel Committee’s capital framework, this means setting aside 
regulatory capital that reflects market risk, amongst other risk factors. 
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A much-used modelling approach is Value at Risk (VAR). This measures the maximum 
potential loss in value of a portfolio of assets over a given period of time for a given confidence 
level. For example, a ten-day 99% VAR measures the maximum expected loss on a portfolio, 
considering 99% of possible losses, as measured over a two-week period. In other words, VAR 
describes a quantile of the loss distribution. VAR methodology is an essential part of firms’ risk 
management and underpins the Basel II capital framework for market risk.11
But VAR is associated with ‘normal’ price falls. Indeed, traditional VAR models rely on the 
normal distribution. Hence, they are less suited to capture the extreme price falls that constitute 
market crashes.
 
12
(i) Stressed VAR: This is a VAR measure which is based on alternative assumptions 
underpinning the VAR calculation (e.g. changing the correlations between the prices of the 
assets comprising a portfolio). 
 More recent risk measurement models recognise the need to incorporate 
extreme price falls. These alternative approaches include: 
Under its revised framework for market risk, the BCBS requires firms to supplement their 
standard VAR with a stressed VAR, which accounts for price movements observed over a 
continuous 12-month period of significant market stress (BIS (2009)). 
(ii) Expected Shortfall, defined as the expected loss arising from price moves beyond the VAR 
threshold.13
Additional insights are provided by research in Extreme Value Theory (EVT) which considers a 
wider range of theoretical distributions with fat tails.
 
14 EVT also offers empirical methods to 
estimate the tails. Subsequent VAR models have built on these insights and replace the normal 
distribution with a particular extreme value distribution.15
Financial market participants also use stress testing, to complement their VAR calculations. 
Stress testing involves running a variety of extreme scenarios, some based on historical events 
(e.g. 1987), and others on simulated scenarios. As such stress testing allows firms to measure 
the impact of a range of large price changes, all beyond the VAR threshold. 
 
Stress testing is also part of banks’ regulatory requirements under the Basel framework (BIS 
(2009)). In their stress testing, banks are required to consider a range of stress events, 
including large stock price falls and severe reductions in market liquidity. Some stress 
                                            
11 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework (BIS 
(2009)). 
12 See e.g. BCBS (2011) for an overview of academic and other critiques of the VAR method. Shortcomings of the 
VAR method highlighted include: (i) the length of the horizon; (ii) liquidity is not taken into account; (iii) portfolios are 
assumed to be unchanged See also Flannery et al (2012) 
13 The Basel Committee (BCBS, 2012) is currently consulting on whether to consider Expected Shortfall as an 
alternative risk metric. 
14 See e.g. McNeil et al (2005). 
15 See e.g. Longin (2000). 
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scenarios may be prescribed by the authorities, others may be considered by the individual firm 
as particularly relevant for its business. 
Stress tests are often run independently of VAR exercises. Recent research advocates that 
firms incorporate the results of stress test scenarios into their VAR analysis. This would require 
firms to assign probabilities to their stress test scenarios, which is inevitably a subjective 
exercise. 16 This integrated stress testing approach is currently not part of the revised Basel II 
framework.17
Common to all the approaches described so far is that very large price falls are deemed 
undesirable. This is particularly true when considering the behaviour of prices within a single 
trading day. Section 3 will discuss the controls in place on trading venues (price limits and 
circuit breakers) to mitigate such intraday price falls. 
 
In summary, financial market participants use a combination of probabilistic analysis and stress 
testing to measure and mitigate the impact of very large price changes on their portfolios. 
Historical data and events play an important part in this process, but simulations based on 
theoretical stress scenarios are used too. 
However, when it comes to measuring the impact of a large price fall on the market as a whole, 
there is no formal framework. Unlike the nuclear industry, the economics profession does not 
categorise the risk of market crashes, or label them ‘tolerable’ or ‘acceptable.’ And there is no 
commonly accepted numerical target for market crashes (e.g. ‘one market crash every x 
decades is acceptable’ or ‘a price fall of x% is acceptable but y% is not’). Instead, market 
practitioners and financial economists have taken a more descriptive approach aimed at 
understanding (i) under which conditions market crashes occur and (ii) whether there are any 
common characteristics. Meanwhile market regulators focus on the need to avoid ‘disorderly’ 
markets, which is a qualitative notion, rather than a precise quantitative target (see Section 
2.3.2). 
2.4. Commentary 
Our analysis suggests the following similarities and differences: 
• When thinking about large-scale risks, both industries’ practices can be interpreted in terms of 
systemic risk 
• Both industries use probabilistic concepts of risk and impact. 
• The nuclear industry has a clear notion of tolerable level of risks and it can set numerical 
targets. Hence, it is able to rigorously assess trade-offs between risk reduction and costs 
(ALARP) 
• In its thinking about financial market crashes, the finance industry relies to a large extent on 
probabilistic methods, using historical data. This is complemented by stress testing, using 
                                            
16 See e.g. BIS (2011). 
17 See BIS (2011). 
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both historical and theoretical stress scenarios. There is also much emphasis on 
understanding past events so that potential future problems can be avoided. 
• Although these past events have undesirable features, which can be measured precisely, 
there is no equivalent of the ALARP principle and there are no numerical targets. 
In addition, it is useful to note the following particular aspects of the nuclear safety analysis and 
risk frameworks: 
• The nuclear industry has a formalised approach to defining the classes of consequence, the 
categories and frequencies of initiating events. It uses theory, models and experiment to 
justify the risk analysis. 
• This means that industry can set risk targets for classes of accident and different classes of 
people, and discusses tolerability and proportionality in reducing them further. 
• In doing so, the industry accepts that many things are hard to quantify, but there is 
nonetheless an emphasis on ranking risks, setting targets for risk reduction, and debating 
whether both the risks and the targets are accurate and acceptable. 
• The nuclear safety analysis framework allows systematic design of protection and mitigation 
systems that cover not only what they have to do, but also how much they have to be trusted. 
These systems use diverse mechanisms to ensure that the overall protection works when it is 
needed. 
• The nuclear industry also places greater emphasis on explaining risks to society at large. This 
in part drives the quantification of risk as there needs to be basis for comparing different types 
and sources of risk. 
2.5. Questions and issues 
The nuclear industry has developed an approach that reflects the need to engineer a complex 
safe system and to explain the safety of what is proposed and implemented to regulators and 
society at large. 
The finance industry has developed a framework for analysing the risks associated with the 
extreme price falls that constitute a market crash. In doing so, the profession has traditionally 
viewed asset prices as being the outcome of human decisions. Hence, they have focused on 
understanding (i) the behaviour of human traders participating in the markets and (ii) how these 
decisions affect the dynamics of asset prices. The risk concepts and tools developed by the 
industry are also largely descriptive: historical data are used to describe extreme events in 
precise statistical terms. These are complemented with scenario-based stress testing. But the 
industry has so far not defined numerical risk targets or tolerability levels for the risk of market 
crashes, that could be used to guide new systemic risk reduction initiatives. 
Looking ahead, one could question whether the rapid development of computer-based trading 
in financial markets requires the adoption of additional risk concepts and tools. When viewing a 
financial market as a complex adaptive system (Foresight 2011), where a large proportion of 
interactions are the result of trades executed by algorithms rather than humans, concepts and 
tools developed in other disciplines may become much more relevant. In particular, the 
discussion in this Section suggests that the following questions are worth asking: 
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1. Is it possible to have a more precise description of risk categories (e.g. in terms of the 
type of consequences, who is affected, the initiating events that precipitated them)? 
2. Is it possible to define precise tolerability criteria? Can one distinguish between tolerable 
and broadly acceptable risks? 
3. Is it possible to define numerical targets? If not, how does one define ‘acceptable’ risk? 
4. Is it possible to develop the notion of a ‘design basis,’ which would characterise those 
adverse endogenous and exogenous events that the system (i.e. the market with its 
control and protective mechanisms in place) should withstand? 
3. Protection parameters and risk controls 
Having defined the key risk concepts used in the nuclear and financial markets context, this 
Section explores in more detail how risk controls are designed and the overall protection 
system architecture is defined. 
3.1. Nuclear protection and control 
3.1.1 Protection and control envelopes 
In an engineered complex system such as a nuclear power plant the protection system is 
designed so that it is possible to infer the state of the plant, (e.g. the condition of the core) from 
a combination of direct and indirect measurements. In Section 2.2.1 we have summarised how 
a systematic safety analysis and design approach leads to a definition of the safety systems 
needed to protect the plant and the parameters that need to be measured. 
A simplified, conceptual, view of the results of this analysis is shown in Figure 4. The red line 
indicates the boundaries for the parameters – in this case indicated as pressure and 
temperature – beyond which plant damage and accidents might occur. The actual boundaries 
could be very complex. In typical commercial reactors there might be 20-30 different physical 
parameters that are measured and used to infer the state of the plant. Furthermore as we have 
seen in Section 2.2.3, the actions to be taken depend on the state of the plant (e.g. is it starting 
up, at power, shutting down, a failure of a protection system detected, in a degraded state) so 
that the boundaries will be a more complex shape than the two dimensions of Figure 4 
suggests. 
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Figure 4. Protection envelope 
 
 
In the design of the protection system, a variety of uncertainties are taken into account to 
simplify the region into an area that is easy to measure and considered as conservative. This 
region is shown in orange in the diagram: the idea is that shutting the plant down when these 
boundaries are reached will lead to a safe state. Within this protection envelope
The design of the reactor control system operating envelope draws on classical linear control 
theory and computer simulation of the plant to validate the stability of the overall system. There 
is a long-standing engineering discipline of control theory and modeling that is used to design a 
variety of feedback and feed forward loops in a plant. This could provide a framework for 
assessing some of the feedback loops discussed in (Foresight 2011). There is also more 
ecologically oriented work that is relevant: viability domains describe a similar concept to 
protection envelopes and their mathematical underpinnings may provide some further insights 
(Deffuant (2011)). It is likely that the non-linear aspect and performative nature of the 
underlying modeling would need some novel approaches to take into account adaptation to the 
viability envelope and possible new failure modes 
 there is an 
economically optimum operating region and this is shown in blue. For example, there might be 
a limiting pressure at which a pipe is weakened to such an extent that there is an unacceptable 
probability that it might burst. Operating just below this pressure may be tolerably safe but 
would reduce the lifetime of the plant and lead to unacceptable cost of replacement and 
inspections. Instead an operating pressure would be chosen that would lead to the pipe being 
de-stressed and would have a long operating life. 
In designing the plant’s measurement strategy, a number of issues have to be taken into 
account. It is not possible to measure at all points in the plant, so properties have to be inferred 
from a few measurements (e.g. by exploiting the symmetry of the plant). In addition, 
measurement errors and the differences between the values measured and the abstract 
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physics based values that are used to define the safe envelopes need to be addressed. 
Redundant sensors are often used to provide measured values that are more trusted (e.g. by 
taking a “vote” and making a decision to act when three out of four values agree). 
There is a need to ensure that spurious trips, that is shutting down the plant when it is not 
necessary, are avoided as these carry both a safety risk and commercial cost. This can be due 
to both an inference problem (i.e. misdiagnosis) or from the failure of components within the 
protection systems. Considerable design effort is used to ensure that there are suitable levels 
of diversity and redundancy
3.1.2 System architecture 
 so that single points of failures are tolerated. 
Reactor protection systems have evolved a long way since the Manhattan project when Enrico 
Fermi deployed a woodsman who was to cut a heavy rope holding a “rod” above the core and 
also three men with buckets of cadmium sulphate, all controlled by Fermi’s hand signals. Yet 
the essential elements were there: diversity and the need for the protection to work when it was 
needed. Modern reactor protection systems have of course also to work when needed: they 
therefore have very high availability and reliability requirements. To achieve this, the 
architecture incorporates segregation, redundancy and diversity as shown schematically in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Simplified protection system architecture 
Although the protection functions may be conceptually simple, such as shutting the plant down 
when the threshold on parameter is reached, it can lead to a variety of complex systems, with 
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hundreds of computers running many hundreds of thousands of lines of code in part because 
of the need to satisfy the non-functional requirements for the system (e.g. the availability 
requirements). There are many tradeoffs to be made and it is fair to say that, while the 
principles of diversity and defence in depth are accepted globally, their implementation in 
system architectures is not internationally agreed. For example, the I&C architectures of the 
proposed US, UK EPRs and the plants being built in Finland, China and France are all 
different. 
Diversity18
The Primary System in Figure 5 is shown as having a number of redundant channels which are 
implemented with the same design of equipment and software. The outputs of these channels 
are voted upon with typically two out of the four channels needed to command a trip. In case of 
channel failure the logic adapts to 2 out of 3 and then 1 out of 2. The redundant channels are 
physically segregated so as to protect against possible common cause and cascade failures 
such as fire. Nevertheless there is often information exchange between channels and it is 
necessary to show that this does not introduce any covert channels and so nullify the benefits 
of the segregation and redundancy. 
 is a key concept and issue in the protection system architectures. In the simplified 
architecture diagram of Figure 5, there are three diverse protection systems – that is different in 
design and implementation technologies - that can each shut down the reactor. The primary is 
generally more complex and computer based with the tertiary being limited to only a few 
functions and possibly implemented with a simpler technology (e.g. dynamic logic or with 
FPGAs). 
The redundancy is necessary to provide the high availability that is needed and particularly 
protects against random failure of hardware. The four channels are needed to keep the 
spurious trip rate low and allow for equipment being out of service and maintained while the 
plant is at power. The diverse redundancy is needed to counter common cause failures and 
epistemic uncertainties e.g. due to common software faults in the common software in the four 
protection channels. 
3.1.3 Failure correlation 
The issue of correlation of failures between protection systems is important and has been 
much studied, particularly in the UK. It is known that claims for independent failure are 
unrealistic (so it is not possible to just multiply the probability of failures of two subsystems to 
get the system probability of failure) yet the degree of correlation is very hard to assess. 
Some experimental results on correlation are shown in Figure 6 and 7. Figure 6 is from a 
seminal Nasa funded experiment (data from Knight (1986)) that shows the improvement in the 
probability of failure of missile detection algorithm as the mean performance improves. The 
other (Figure 7) is from a software competition with many thousands of entrants and shows the 
reliability improvement of a diverse pair, relative to a single version (from Meulen (2008)). The 
horizontal axis shows the average probability of failure on demand of the pool from which both 
                                            
18 Or diverse redundancy, “The presence of two or more systems or components to perform an identified function, 
where the systems or components have different attributes so as to reduce the possibility of common cause failure, 
including common mode failure”. Diversity could result in different development lifecycles, different organisations, 
and different implementation technologies. The term “redundancy” denotes replicated, sometimes identical, systems 
or structures e.g. in protecting against fire by having identical systems located in different places. 
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programs are selected. The vertical axis shows the reliability improvement from having a 
second algorithm. 
The main message from these experiments is that on average one only gets one or two orders 
of magnitude improvement in the probability of failure on demand by deploying diverse 
systems. One explanation for this is that independent designers and developers make similar 
mistakes because of the inherent difficulty of the problem that the algorithm is solving. The 
presence of these correlations and the non-independence of failures is a robust result, 
replicated across experiments sponsored by Nasa, the nuclear industry and others. It may be 
an area where there could be some cross-over to the assessments of diverse trading 
algorithms (e.g. see the Foresight Driver Review DR13, (Foresight 2011b)) 
Figure 6. Experimental results on diversity 
Figure 7. Experimental results on diversity 
 
 
In summary, the functions of the protection systems in a nuclear plant can be conceptualised 
as enforcing a safe conservative envelope on plant parameters (e.g. temperature, flow, 
pressure). To implement this abstract view requires a detailed approach to measurement 
accuracy and trustworthiness, as further explained in Section 4. In addition, the need to 
implement the non-functional aspects of the protection (e.g. to operate when required with a 
very low probability of failure) leads to the provision of multiple diverse systems. 
Computer trading and systemic risk: a nuclear perspective 
42 
3.2. Financial markets 
In Section 3.3., we consider whether the concepts defined in Section 3.1can be applied to 
understand and mitigate risks in financial markets. Before doing so, Section 3.2. describes the 
existing processes in financial markets to prevent and halt large intraday price falls. As before, 
the focus is on continuous-auction type equity markets. We also provide a very brief overview 
of the regulatory framework. 
The controls described in this Section are aimed at ensuring that trading venues have both the 
operational and liquidity resilience that is required for their smooth daily functioning, including 
their essential price discovery role (see Section 2.3.2). Hence, one of their main objectives is 
controlling intraday price movements. As the history of market crashes shows, they may not be 
able to prevent all large price falls, particularly those that happen over an extended period of 
time and/or are the result of a sudden shift in investor sentiment. But together, these controls 
are aimed at increasing the robustness of trading venues. 
3.2.1 Objectives 
Most trading venues have a number of processes in place aimed at avoiding extreme price 
movements. These include price limits, trading halts (also referred to as circuit breakers) as 
well as controls to detect erroneous messages and to limit the number of messages (order 
submissions and/or cancellations) that market participants can send to the trading venue. In 
addition, market participants themselves have operational controls in place, e.g. to limit the risk 
of sending erroneous messages to the trading venue. 
Both trading venues and market participants have incentives to introduce such controls: trading 
venues aim to avoid disorderly market conditions (See Section 2.3.2 for a definition), while 
market participants wish to avoid trading losses that may arise from erroneous trades. In 
addition, both trading venues and market participants are subject to regulatory requirements 
(see box 7). 
Box 7. Regulation of financial markets – recent developments 
IOSCO regularly reviews its regulatory standards in the light of market developments. A 
recent study assesses the impact of technological change on market integrity. In this report, 
IOSCO (2011) sets out a number of high-level recommendations for market participants 
using computerised trading: 
• Pre-trade controls that are suitable for high-speed markets; 
• Stress testing of algorithms before they are used 
• While trading venues should have the following in place: 
• Order entry controls to detect and stop anomalous order entry 
• Trade cancellation process 
• Stress testing (ability of platform to cope with unusually high order numbers) 
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• A testing environment for market participants to test new algorithms 
• Price limits or circuit breakers 
Efforts are also underway to improve real-time monitoring of trading. For example, in the US, 
regulators have recommended the establishment of a consolidated audit trail which would 
allow monitoring of the flow of orders executed in different venues. In response to the May 
2010 Flash crash US regulators have also introduced new pre-trade controls and are piloting 
new circuit breakers. 
In Europe, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is being reviewed, and is 
expected to include a range of measures to be adopted by both trading venues and market 
participants using computerised trading, including possibly order cancellation measures; 
market maker commitments and circuit breakers. 
Recent guidelines published by ESMA, the European Securities and Markets Authority, 
include enhanced operational requirements (ESMA (2011)). These apply both to platform 
operators and to investment firms using computerised trading. They include amongst other 
things: 
For trading platforms: 
• Effective arrangements to ensure trading systems are resilient, have sufficient capacity 
and are able to ensure fair and orderly trading. 
• Effective arrangements to prevent excessive flooding of the order book (e.g. through 
participant limits) and to ensure capacity limits are not being breached. 
• Measures to constrain or halt trading in individual or multiple securities, when necessary. 
• Business continuity arrangements to deal with unforeseen failure of trading systems. 
• Effective arrangements to monitor market activity as close to real time as possible. 
• Appropriate risk controls for members providing direct access, and for members who are 
not credit institutions. 
• Record keeping requirements. 
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For investment firms: 
• Effective systems and risk controls to ensure trading systems are resilient and have 
sufficient capacity, are subject to appropriate thresholds and limits and prevent the 
sending of erroneous orders 
• Effective arrangements to block or cancel orders that do not meet pre-trade controls. 
• Business continuity arrangements to deal with unforeseen failure of trading systems. 
• Testing requirements for new trading algorithms. 
• Effective arrangements to monitor trading activity as close to real time as possible, 
including control of messaging traffic to individual platforms. 
• Appropriate risk controls for direct access arrangements, including pre-set trading and 
credit thresholds. 
• Record keeping requirements. 
 
3.2.2 Risk controls - slowing down or halting trading 
Section 2 explained that extreme price changes are a manifestation of extreme illiquidity. In 
some cases, this happens because market participants choose to coordinate their actions (all 
become sellers and/or withdraw from the market). In other cases, illiquidity may be the result of 
an algorithm generating a very large order imbalance. This may in turn cause human traders to 
react to the observed order imbalance, resulting in further illiquidity. 
A first set of risk controls is aimed directly at slowing down the intraday price changes that may 
result from sudden changes in liquidity. This may be done in the following ways: 
• Price limits constrain trading within a pre-specified band: trades within the band are 
processed as normal; trades outside the band are rejected. Sometimes these are referred to 
as price-collars. 
• A trading halt stops all trading for a (sometimes) pre-specified period. On some markets, 
trading is initially resumed via a batch auction. After this, normal processes continue. 
• Price limits and trading halts can be static or dynamic: in the latter case, the triggering point is 
updated as market conditions develop. For example, a price fall that reflects a change in 
underlying fundamentals can be ‘managed’ in an orderly manner. 
These price-based limits differ from procedures in place to avoid price changes that would 
result from erroneous trades (so-called fat-finger mistakes). Both trading platforms and market 
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participants are required to have operational controls in place to avoid such errors disrupting 
the market (ESMA (2011) and box 7). 
A key challenge for financial market operators (and their regulators) is how to define a price 
limit: 
• Whether the limit applies to a single stock or to the wider market; 
• Whether the limit applies to a single trading venue, or is set in coordination with other trading 
venues (e.g. other equity markets or derivatives markets) (see also 3.2.4); 
• How to set the trigger points; 
• Whether to choose static or dynamic limits; 
• Whether to halt trading or simply slow down price changes. 
The principal trade-off for market operators is between avoiding large intraday price changes 
on the one hand, and disrupting trading on the other hand. The empirical literature on this topic 
is largely inconclusive, with some, but not all, finding evidence that price limits and trading halts 
are effective in reducing price volatility. Proponents of trading halts further argue that they offer 
a useful pause, allowing market participants to assess their exposures, before returning to the 
market. Critics, however, argue that price limits and trading halts may contribute to price 
volatility, e.g. by acting as a ‘magnet.’ 19
Likewise, there is some debate about coordinating trading halts across venues, often referred 
to as cross-market circuit breakers. Some argue that this is essential to avoid cross-market 
contagion (SEC (2011)), while others point out that it is very difficult to determine the relevant 
parameters given the diversity of trading venues. 
 
A second set of controls, often used in conjunction with price limits, is aimed at controlling the 
flow of order message traffic, rather than the price changes that may result from those orders. 
These include: 
• Measures to control the number of messages sent to the exchanges; 
• Measures to control order cancellations. 
Practical challenges for the market operator are: 
• Whether to control all messages or order cancellations only; 
• Setting critical thresholds (e.g. cancellations up to a point may be allowed); 
• Choosing between hard limits (e.g. a fee on orders or cancellations above a certain threshold) 
or soft limits; 
                                            
19 Foresight is undertaking more work on the effectiveness of price limits. 
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• Whether to target orders generated by automated strategies, or all orders. 
Most trading venues have measures in place that allow them to monitor and control message 
traffic, and this is typically a regulatory requirement to avoid capacity problems (ESMA (2011) 
and box 7). Measures to control or limit order cancellations are more controversial, with some 
arguing that their increased prevalence is the direct result of computerised trading and may 
result in an ‘illusion’ of liquidity. Others point out that order cancellations are a useful tool in 
managing trading exposures. The academic literature in this area remains sparse. 
It is an open question as to whether the very high-frequency price changes documented in 
recent academic work (see Box 6) warrant controls that operate at these higher frequencies. 
Moreover, such controls would need to act very quickly, to match the speed of the algorithms 
behind the price movements. Furthermore, it is as yet unclear how venues would define such 
controls, how they would set the trigger levels, or how they would measure their effectiveness. 
3.2.3 Risk controls – ensuring resilience and diversity 
The controls in Section 3.2.2 either aim to control the overall volume of transactions, or the 
resulting price changes. Alternatively, trading venues could take measures to ensure that 
liquidity is resilient so there are sufficient buyers and sellers in the market throughout the 
trading day. These measures include: 
• Market maker schemes: these are formal arrangements, which require a select group of 
market participants to be active in the market for a pre-specified portion of the trading day. 
Market makers will typically be required to quote continuous prices, keep prices within a pre-
specified band, and quote above a pre-specified minimum size. In return, they may receive 
fee rebates or bonus payments. 
• Liquidity incentive schemes: these are less formal arrangements, which encourage market 
participants to bring their trades to the market, typically in return for a fee rebate. Some 
encourage the posting of limit orders. Others offer more attractive fee rebates for orders 
posted during periods of increased market stress (so-called peak load pricing). 
Again, the key challenge for financial market operators is to define the precise scheme: 
• Whether to choose a formal or informal scheme; 
• How to set the minimum requirements; 
• How to set the incentives; 
• Whether to put in place special arrangements for times of market stress, and how to define 
the thresholds for ‘market stress.’ 
When working, such arrangements result in greater liquidity resilience (i.e. liquidity providers 
will stay in the market for longer), delaying the point at which price limits or trading halts may 
need to be invoked. Again, the academic evidence is mixed. Some studies show that the 
introduction of market maker arrangements does indeed lower intraday price volatility and 
improves liquidity, e.g. for less actively traded stocks. But there is no academic evidence on 
their effectiveness in periods of market stress. Indeed, a key issue for debate is whether 
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market maker arrangements can be effective in periods of market stress, or whether dedicated 
market makers would simply withdraw (like other market participants) in order to limit their 
exposure when prices are falling rapidly. 
Market maker and liquidity provision schemes may help liquidity resilience by encouraging 
more traders to come to the market. A further question is whether one can ensure that the limit 
order book is sufficiently rich and deep at all times (i.e. the book contains buy and sell orders 
for a wide range of prices and sizes), so incoming market orders do not cause the limit order 
book to become unbalanced or empty. In other words, would encouraging diversity in trading 
lead to greater liquidity resilience in the short term, and greater market confidence in the longer 
term? Diversity in trading may arise from having participants with different trading motives and 
horizons (e.g. short-term market makers versus long-term buy-and-hold investors), different 
views (e.g. on whether a stock is over or underpriced) or different trade execution preferences 
(e.g. whether to use market or limit orders). Diversity may also be the result of having 
competing trading venues with different trading models. More work is needed to understand 
how to promote diversity of trading in financial markets, and whether measures to increase 
such diversity would have a discernible impact on liquidity resilience.20
3.2.4 Risk controls – correlated failures 
 
In the nuclear industry, correlated failures are an important topic of concern. These can arise 
for a variety of reasons: there can be common mechanisms such as flood or security 
vulnerabilities that nullify several risk control barriers at once, there can be common design 
flaws in similar barriers and there can be correlated failures among diverse systems due to 
coupling in the problem domain (see Figure 6). In addition there can be cascade failures where 
failure of one component or system can impact another. All these issues need to be addressed 
in the design and evaluation of the systems and their risk controls. 
In the context of financial markets, correlated failures may refer to instances where problems in 
one trading venue “spill-over” into another venue. Such spill-overs may take the following 
forms: 
• Capacity constraints on one venue may cause orders to be re-routed (sometimes 
automatically) to other, related venues; 
• Delays in processing orders on one venue may affect the availability of up-to date prices, both 
in the affected and in related trading venues; 
• Controls applied in one venue may cause orders to be re-routed to other, related venues; in 
turn contributing to price volatility, and possibly to the triggering of controls in these venues. 
Hence, an important question to ask is: how can one venue protect itself within a correlated 
environment? What are the implications of controls that are applied in a non-coordinated 
fashion (e.g. circuit breakers triggered at different price levels)? How would co-ordinated circuit 
breakers work instead? These questions are currently being explored by both European and 
US regulators. 
                                            
20 Foresight is undertaking more work on the effectiveness of market making and liquidity incentives schemes. 
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Further insights may be gained from the literature on complex systems. In Foresight (2011) 
DR4), it is agued that financial markets have become complex adaptive systems, in which 
extreme changes can happen in unexpected ways (Foresight (2011) DR4). Moreover, as 
financial markets have become increasingly interconnected, they can be viewed as ‘systems of 
systems.’ (DR4). Even if trading venues operate independent systems, they may be linked by 
algorithmic trading systems operating in more than one venue and/or conditioning their trading 
strategies on prices in more than one venue. Moreover, such connections are made at very 
high speeds. It follows that a failure in one or more constituents (market venues) could have 
widespread repercussions. It also implies that system-level failure is difficult to predict, not only 
because both humans and computers can adapt their behavior over time (and can do so at 
high speed), but also because of the sheer number of possible interactions between humans 
and computers, both within and across venues. 
3.3. Commentary 
Comparing the use of risk controls in the nuclear industry and financial markets reveals the 
following: 
• Both employ risk controls, based on thresholds beyond which operations need to be halted 
(or slowed down). These controls are set by the operators, and are typically subject to 
regulatory supervision. 
• In the nuclear industry, this is the result of a systematic engineering analysis, summarised in 
the protection envelope and the Fault and Protection Schedule. 
• In financial markets, these controls typically depend on a smaller and less complex set of 
parameters (e.g. traded prices or message volumes). 
• Unlike the nuclear protection systems, there is no formal mechanism for describing how much 
the controls themselves have to be trusted (e.g. in terms of probability of failure on demand, 
probability of spurious activation). 
• There is considerable debate on the effectiveness of some of the risk controls, partly because 
of the lack of evidence on how they might perform during periods of market stress. 
The brief overview of the control and protection of a nuclear plant raises a number of issues 
that may be of relevance as financial markets consider how to adapt to existing risk controls to 
the new computerised trading environment: 
• Engineering succeeds by making the complex systems controllable and predictable (within 
limits). Although the underlying processes are complex and complicated the ability to model 
and design the plant and to have a scientific based understanding of what might happen 
allows the functional aspects of the protection (controls) to be relatively simple. However 
there are more onerous requirements on the non-functional aspects as the systems really do 
need to operate when needed. 
• The ability to engineer a control and protection system relies on observability of the system. 
The notion that the financial market is an observable system in readily identified states is only 
partially true. It is clear in our review of market crashes that there are competing theories and 
perspectives. There is evidence that some crashes appear to just happen and that these are 
irreducible and so there is no difference between a transition to a systemic loss and an 
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everyday one. Others would argue that indeed there is a difference; it is just that we do not 
(yet) have the means to identify the hidden states that precede a systemic event (Foresight 
(2011)). This has implications for the extent to which market controls can be engineered. 
• Protection systems have authority to override any other system and force a shut down. If they 
operate when not needed (e.g. due to internal failures, operator error) they can cause 
spurious plant disturbances with consequential economic costs and safety implications. There 
is a need to define performance measures for spurious activation (e.g. once every 10 years) 
as well as for the probability of failures per demand. (The impact of this on architectures and 
assurance is discussed in Section 4) 
• There is trade off between economic benefits and having a simple protection envelope. As the 
understanding of the nuclear plant has developed over the years, protection envelopes have 
become more complex and computer based. There can be considerable off-line data analysis 
and modelling to derive the parameters for these systems: so that trust is needed in both the 
protection algorithms and the data. 
• Adaptation and learning is very important, but in a nuclear plant occurs in different timeband 
from the control and protection actions e.g. months for procedures and safety culture, years 
for updating equipment, decades for design of plant. 
• There is a need to get the best mix of between reliable automation and human analysis and 
adaptation. This is a sophisticated topic, but in brief, the design needs to play to humans’ 
strengths of understanding and adaptation. 
• In safety engineering there are examples that introducing safety or protection measures can 
change people’s behaviour so safety improvements are only temporary as people adapt. The 
complex adaptive nature of markets means that this could be a significant future issue in 
designing control and protection especially as these might provide unintended opportunities 
for new forms of regulatory arbitrage or market abuse. 
• The nuclear industry uses defence in depth and diversity to achieve effective risk controls and 
these require independently developed solutions to avoid systemic failures. However there is 
experimental data and associated theories that show that despite this independence, failures 
are correlated. This may be an area where there could be some crossover to the 
assessments of diverse trading algorithms and risk controls (e.g. see the Foresight Driver 
Review DR13, (Foresight (2011b))). 
3.4. Questions and issues 
As financial markets are developing into more complex computer-based systems, it is worth 
asking whether the concept of a protection envelope would be helpful. 
1. What would the protection and control envelopes look like? 
2. What would be the parameters that need to be measured and what would we infer from 
them? How are they related to existing controls such as price limits or circuit breakers? 
3. What would the availability and reliability requirement be for such a system e.g. the 
probability of failure on demand, the frequency of spurious activation? 
4. What is the balance between automation and operator recovery? 
5. What additional understanding (and research) is needed given the complex adaptive 
systems nature of markets? How would the markets adapt to having such protection? 
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6. What additional analysis techniques and data are needed to assess the risks arising from 
correlated failures and to design risk controls to guard against their impact? 
4. Trust in computer based systems 
Computer based systems, and ICT in general, are of course essential for high-frequency 
trading and for algorithmic trading more broadly: for market participants to process information, 
design trading strategies, and execute the trades; for operators of trading venues and 
regulators to collect and process the data for monitoring and market surveillance and for 
operators to provide protection and intervention via so-called “circuit breakers”. In all cases, 
systems will need to be sufficiently trusted: how do we describe that level of trust and how is 
this evaluated? 
4.1. Software assurance in the nuclear industry 
In this Section we consider the principles, strategy and techniques used to assure the software 
in reactor protection systems. 
4.1.1 Excellence of production and confidence building 
The reactor protection system is crucially dependent on software and complex electronics. In 
the UK nuclear industry the justification is based on two important safety principles that come 
from the SAPs. These are 
“Where the system reliability is significantly dependent upon the performance of computer 
software, the establishment of and compliance with appropriate standards and 
practices throughout the software development life-cycle should be made, 
commensurate with the level of reliability required, by a demonstration of 
‘production excellence’ and ‘confidence-building’ measures.” (ESS27 from HSE (2006)) 
This approach of “confidence building” and “production excellence” is known in the nuclear 
safety domain as the “two-legged approach” and is discussed below in more detail. 
4.1.2 Production excellence 
“Production excellence”, as the name suggest, requires a demonstration of excellence in all 
aspects of production, covering initial specification through to the finally commissioned 
system. It expects compliance with standards and implementation of a QA programme as well 
as a comprehensive testing and analysis to check every system function, including: 
• The verification of all phases of the system production process and the validation of the 
integrated system against its requirements specification by persons not involved in the 
specification and design activities; 
• A demonstration that the safety system, in conjunction with the plant, performs to 
requirements, this demonstration being devised by persons other than the system specifiers, 
designers or manufacturers; and 
• A programme of dynamic testing, applied to the complete system that is capable of 
demonstrating that the system meets its reliability requirements. 
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This latter point is important: it introduces the requirement for statistical testing in which 
simulated operation of many thousands of tests are used to provide a numerical indication of the 
reliability (subject of course to many assumptions and uncertainties). 
Box 8. Software reliability 
The use of probabilities to characterize software dependability is sometimes challenged. It is 
argued that because software failures are systematic – if it fails in certain circumstances, it 
will always fail when those circumstances are repeated – there is no role for probability. The 
answer to this apparent paradox is that there is uncertainty about which inputs will cause 
failure, and about when these will be executed. So the software failures that occur form a 
stochastic process and the uncertainty associated with this process is aleatory, i.e. it is 
“uncertainty in the world” and is irreducible. 
In addition to this aleatory uncertainty, there is also epistemic uncertainty concerning the 
models and reasoning that are used to estimate and predict reliability. For example, in 
operational testing, there may be uncertainty about the correctness of the test oracle that is 
used to asses whether a test is successful or not, and about the representativeness with 
respect to real-life operation of the test case selections. Epistemic uncertainty is in principle 
reducible, e.g. by collecting more and better evidence concerning the subject of the 
uncertainty. 
If weaknesses are found in the production process, compensating measures must be applied 
which are targeted at the specific weaknesses: these may be designed to rectify or mitigate the 
weaknesses. 
4.1.3 Independent confidence building measures 
Independent confidence building measures (ICBMs) are required to provide a thorough and 
challenging assessment of fitness for purpose, but should be reasonably practicable (see 
Section 2.2.5). They will involve: 
• Complete and preferably diverse checking of the software (after validation has been 
completed) by a team independent of the suppliers; 
• Independent assessment of the full test programme, covering the full scope of the testing 
activities. 
4.1.4 Assessment strategy 
In a reactor protection system there will be many different software components with different 
supply chains and provenance. In a typical modern reactor protection system there will be 
hundreds of processors and associated software for smart sensors, communication, voting, 
signal processing, data fusion, decision-making, self-testing, interface to maintenance 
equipment and provision of information. Practice and research in the nuclear industry and 
elsewhere has found it helpful to use the concepts of claims, argument and evidence 
(introduced in Box 2) in discussing the assurance of systems and to view the overall 
assessment strategy in terms of the Assessment Triangle (as in Figure 8) that balances: a rule 
based compliance approach (the blue rectangle), the goal-based demonstration of positive 
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safety properties (the yellow rectangle), and the risk-informed demonstration of absence of 
negative vulnerabilities (the red rectangle). 
Figure 8. Assessment triangle 
It is perhaps not surprising that for a critical system utmost care is required in its development; 
that claims made about the system should be challenged and that high quality evidence is 
required to show that it is fit for purpose. As outlined above in the principles (Section 4.1.1) and 
in the more detailed supporting standards and guidelines, independence is considered 
essential and appears both in the initial verification and validation of the system; in the 
challenge and confidence building activities and in the layers of internal and external regulatory 
oversight. 
4.1.5 Assurance techniques 
The assessment triangle and associated Claims-Argument-Evidence structures can be used to 
guide the selection of development and assessment techniques. The approach might be 
guided by goal-based assessments of attributes (e.g. demonstration of accuracy, reliability, 
etc.) including assessment of potential vulnerabilities in the implementation of the 
system/component and formal demonstration of certain integrity properties (e.g. deadlock, run 
time exceptions caused by divide by zero). 
In terms of the critical evidence that is required, two aspects should be emphasised from the 
Safety Assessment Principles. The first is the use of (modern) static analysis techniques and 
the second the need for statistical testing. Both of these activities can require significant 
resources or elapsed time. While no estimates are available for New Build an informed guess 
might put the analysis activity, even with modern computer science techniques of proof and 
model checking to be 10s if not 100s of person years of effort, and the high-fidelity testing to 
last at least a year. This is for systems of several hundreds of thousands of line of code and 
some hundreds of processors. 
Advances in computer science and the engineering of the associated tools has been dramatic 
in the past five years. The types of modern techniques that can now be deployed on the 
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analysis and testing of nuclear software is varied (Guerra (2010)). These include formal 
mathematical proof supported by model checking and SAT solvers; concurrency analyses 
based on process algebra tools and abstract interpretation to find runtime errors (such as 
divide by zero). However despite these advances, assessment is still a specialist activity and 
considerable applied research and innovation is needed to scale these techniques to 
forthcoming protection systems such as envisaged on New Build. 
In addition, more traditional techniques will also be deployed such as: testing against 
requirements; negative testing designed to abuse and misuse the system; the analysis of test 
coverage of the code; manual expert review; checking compliance with standards; 
demonstrating that the software tools used do not compromise the integrity of the code. This 
may involve source code to binary comparisons or a justification of code generators either in 
general or for a specific system that has been developed. 
It is also noteworthy that apart from the simulated experience of statistical testing, there is 
limited scope for using experience to justify reliability claims particularly as confidence is 
needed before these systems are put into operation. Even in France after many years of 
computer based protection systems they still have probably responded to only 500 trips. 
However, experience can still provide important evidence that can be used to help focus the 
assessment and should be scrutinised for counter-evidence to the confidence building results. 
4.1.6 Summary 
One could sum up the assurance approach for reactor protection systems as “Do everything 
and do it at least twice”. Specific measures that are used to achieve assurance are: 
• The use of a very careful development lifecycle with trusted tools and extensive verification 
and validation; 
• The independent static analysis and mathematical proof of the software with respect to its 
specification and known vulnerability classes; 
• The use of statistical testing to simulate live operation; 
• The challenging of the system with negative testing designed to abuse and misuse the 
system; 
• The compliance with appropriate standards. 
Thee approaches are deployed on protection systems and adjusted depending on the criticality 
of the system or component that is being assured. 
4.2. Assurance of computer based trading in financial markets- some 
observations 
In Section 2.3.2, we explained in which circumstances an operational outage ceases to be ‘just 
another computer glitch.’ Section 3.2 described the set of risk controls employed by operators 
of trading venues aimed at avoiding extreme price movements. In this Section, we return to the 
issue of operational errors and outages, and focus on those problems that may arise from 
computer malfunctioning, either at the level of the user (market participant) or the trading 
venue. This allows us to introduce the notion of trust in trading algorithms. 
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Table 5 below provides a simple classification of problems caused by faulty algorithms. The 
first set of incidents concerns individual trades that have gone wrong – often dubbed “fat 
fingers” to capture the idea that someone has hit the wrong button or punched the wrong key. 
Some of these are quite straightforward and may be easily attributable and understandable. 
Others, however, may be more difficult to detect or assess, particularly if the fault lies buried 
inside a complicated algorithm. 
The second set of operational problems concern trading platforms. An operational outage may 
involve a disruption in the data feed to or from the trading venue; it may involve a failure of the 
computer system matching orders; or it may be result of the erroneous deletion of trades 
entered in the venue’s system. In some instances, an operational fault in one venue may affect 
a range of related venues. 
The third set of problems arises from the interaction between algorithms, either within a single 
venue, or across multiple venues. These incidents are the hardest to understand and assess. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that when a price falls very rapidly (say to zero) and then 
recovers equally fast, this might be the result of a new algorithm being tested in the market. 
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Table 5. Problem classification 
 Type of problem Possible impacts 
Problems 
with 
individual 
algorithms 
‘Fat finger’ trades 
i.e. a faulty trade 
arising from a 
keyboard error.  
Can lead to a trade which 
exceeds a firm’s capital. 
Can lead to further price falls if 
undetected. 
 Faulty algorithm 
Algorithm triggering erroneous 
sell orders may result in 
significant price falls across range 
of stocks 
Algorithm sending very high 
number of erroneous messages 
may overwhelm trading venue’s 
systems 
Problems at 
trading 
venues 
Trade matching 
engine not 
available 
Data feed not 
available 
Erroneous 
cancellation of 
orders entered into 
the venue’s system 
 
Impact may be mild if restored 
swiftly and technical nature of 
problem rapidly known 
Longer-lasting outage at primary 
exchange may affect price 
discovery in related markets. 
May lead to fall in confidence and 
lower liquidity in short/medium 
term 
Problems 
arising from 
the 
interaction 
between 
algorithms 
Atypical and short-
lived price 
movements  
Difficult to attribute and assess 
impact. Explanations offered 
include algorithm being tested/ 
withdrawn  
 
ESMA (2011) outlines detailed guidelines for trading venues operating electronic trading 
systems and for market participants using electronic trading systems and trading algorithms. 
Some of these guidelines can be said to deal with the issue of trust, as described in Section 
4.1. Specifically: 
• Governance: ESMA requires clear lines of accountability for the sign-off of development, 
initial deployment, updates and resolution of problems in relation to electronic trading systems 
and trading algorithms (ESMA (2011), p. 32 & 35); 
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• Testing: ESMA requires clearly-delineated development and testing methodologies, including 
performance simulations, back testing and offline testing. These tests need to ensure that 
electronic trading systems or trading algorithms can work in stressed market conditions 
(ESMA (2011), p. 33 & 36); 
• Record keeping: ESMA requires trading venues and market participants to keep records 
regarding key decisions, testing methodologies, test results and periodic reviews (ESMA 
(2011), p. 34 & 37); 
In sum, in Section 3, we explained how the functionality and trust required from a protection 
system depends on the quality of the system that it is protecting and the consequences of 
failure and spurious activation. In the nuclear example plant design and siting is used to reduce 
the exogenous and endogenous hazards. For the latter, redundancy and defence in depth is 
used to ensure that single failures, or anticipated frequent failures of components, do not lead 
to costly challenges on the protection system or to higher levels of trust than necessary. 
In the context of trading venues and computer-based trading, similar considerations and trade-
offs apply. At one extreme one could have trading constrained in such a way that there is no 
need for any additional protection (akin to having intrinsic safety in engineered systems) and at 
the other an unconstrained approach where there was fast, trusted and powerful protection that 
enabled complete freedom for the trading approaches (somewhat analogous to unstable 
aircraft where they can only be flown with continuous computer based control). 
In practice one suspects a balanced strategy would be required and indeed a different strategy 
for different types of hazard. How to decide on a particular approach is outside the scope of 
this paper, but it illustrates that there is close coupling between: 
• How much trust we need in the trading algorithms and platforms; 
• How much trust is needed in any protection mechanisms (whether automated or procedural) 
As we are concerned about systemic risk it is likely that different approaches will be required 
for (see also Table 5 earlier in this Section): 
• Single users of algorithms 
• Collective/correlated behaviour across algorithms/participants within a platform/venue; 
• Collective/correlated behaviour across platform/venue 
So we could imagine an approach under which the market and venues should be able to 
tolerate a single rogue algorithm. In addition some as yet un-designed protection could be 
deployed against hazardous collective behaviours with measures taken to address correlated 
and cascade failures across markets/venues. Together, these approaches would be shown to 
present tolerable systemic risks. 
If such an approach was adopted, then one could foresee trust requirements being articulated 
for the computer-based trading and the protection systems. These would differ from the nuclear 
example in: 
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• The speed of response and functionality of the protection 
• The trusted needed in the protection 
• The nature and assurance of the trading algorithms. 
The latter concern the rapid rate of adaptation of the algorithms, the development lifecycles, 
the emphasis on rapid prototyping and back testing to gain assurance, and the risk 
management via gradual introduction into service. The safety properties of the algorithm may 
be very different from the overall functionality e.g. the need for high confidence in lack of 
extreme behavior. 
4.3. Questions and issues 
The above discussion leads to the following questions: 
1. What would be the advantages/disadvantages of having an explicit assessment of the 
trust needed in computer-based systems and prospective protection and control 
measures? 
2. What are the trade-offs between providing protection mechanisms at a venue level vs. 
those on individual users of algorithms? 
3. What different levels of trust for individual, collective and cross-market behaviours are 
required? 
4. What software engineering techniques would be appropriate to assure future algorithmic 
systems? 
5. Conclusions 
The nuclear industry and finance industries may seem worlds apart. A nuclear plant relies on 
decades of science based engineering, the plant is static, physically identifiable, remotely 
located, each reactor owned and licensed to a single operator with strong incentives to ensure 
safety and to ensure the remaining risks are tolerable. 
The finance industry relies on centuries-old risk concepts, yet is fluid, innovative, and fast 
changing. Risk taking is an intrinsic part of its day-to-day functioning. Diversity abounds, both in 
terms of market participants and infrastructure providers. Competition between participants and 
infrastructure providers drives both innovation and risk taking. Technology allows participants 
to be present in multiple venues at once. 
Yet this industry too is concerned with safety and systemic risk mitigation as well as its impact 
on the broader economy. Both market participants and infrastructure providers have incentives 
to ensure the system is robust and inspires confidence. As described in [Foresight (2011)], the 
increase of computer-based trading has created new challenges for the industry. These relate 
to the understanding of the interaction between human traders and computer algorithms (see 
also [Foresight (2011), DR13], the implications for systemic risk and the development of new 
risk controls for use by both market participants and infrastructure providers. 
In this paper, we have focused on three areas where the issues and practices in the nuclear 
industry resonate with those raised by the evolution of computer-based trading in financial 
markets. These are: 
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• The approaches to systemic risk definition and evaluation. 
• The defintion of protection system parameters, risk controls and architecture. 
• The need for trust in computer-based systems. 
The paper is written for the Foresight project and is constrained to not develop policy 
recommendations. However, we have identified a number of key questions that we think 
capture the findings of this study and that could inform future discussions. 
5.1. Approaches to systemic risk 
Looking ahead, one could question whether the rapid development of computer-based trading 
in financial markets requires the adoption of additional risk concepts and tools. Our analysis 
suggests that the following questions are worth asking: 
1. Is it possible to have a more precise description of risk categories (e.g. in terms of the 
type of consequences, who is affected, the initiating events that precipitated them)? 
2. Is it possible to define precise tolerability criteria? Can one distinguish between tolerable 
and broadly acceptable risks? 
3. Is it possible to define numerical targets? If not, how does one define ‘acceptable’ risk? 
4. Is it possible to develop the notion of a ‘design basis,’ which would characterise those 
adverse endogenous and exogenous events that the system (i.e. the market with its 
control and protective mechanisms in place) should withstand? 
Our analysis showed that systemic risk is a multi-faceted concept, which is difficult to measure 
and monitor. Nonetheless, the comparison with the nuclear industry outlines useful questions 
for future work. 
5.2. Protection systems 
In other Foresight reviews (Foresight (2011) DR4) it is agued that financial markets have 
become complex adaptive systems, in which extreme events can occur in unexpected ways 
Moreover, as financial markets have become increasingly interconnected, they can be viewed 
as ‘systems of systems.’ This means that a failure in one or more constituent parts (market 
venues) could have widespread repercussions. It also implies that system-level failure is 
difficult to predict, not only because both humans and computers can adapt their behaviour 
over time (and can do so at high speed), but also because of the sheer number of possible 
interactions between humans and computers, both within and across venues. These 
complexities make it worth asking whether the concept of a protection or viability envelope 
would be helpful and at the same time these complexities add enormously to the challenge of 
designing and validating such an approach. We have identified the following specific questions 
to help articulate these issues: 
1. What would the protection and control envelopes look like? 
2. What would be the parameters that need to be measured and what would we infer from 
them? How are they related to existing controls such as price limits or circuit breakers? 
3. What would the availability and reliability requirement be for such a system e.g. the 
probability of failure on demand, the frequency of spurious activation? 
4. What is the balance between automation and operator recovery? 
5. What additional understanding (and research) is needed given the complex adaptive 
systems nature of markets? How would the markets adapt to having such protection? 
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6. What additional analysis techniques and data are needed to assess the risks arising from 
correlated failures and to design risk controls to guard against their impact? 
The questions raised could be useful in further exploring the challenge of developing viability 
envelopes and designing protection systems. 
5.3. Computer assurance 
Computer based systems, and ICT in general, are of course essential for high-frequency 
trading and for algorithmic trading more broadly. In all cases, systems will need to be 
sufficiently trusted: how do we describe that level of trust and how is this evaluated? 
Our comparison with the nuclear sector leads to the following questions: 
1. What would be the advantages/disadvantages of having an explicit assessment of the 
trust needed in computer-based systems and prospective protection and control 
measures? 
2. What are the trade-offs between providing protection mechanisms at a venue level vs. 
those on individual users of algorithms? 
3. What different levels of trust for individual, collective and cross-market behaviours are 
required? 
4. What software engineering techniques would be appropriate to assure future algorithmic 
systems? 
Our analysis in this paper underlines the importance of trust in computer-based systems. The 
questions outlined above may be helpful in exploring this topic in the context of financial 
markets and to assess whether it would be worthwhile to use some of the nuclear assurance 
strategies and techniques as a basis for innovative approaches in the financial sector. 
5.4. Some final observations 
In both industries, there are limitations to the amount of systemic risk that can be mitigated: 
both industries bring benefits and have, inherent in their activities, risks to society as a whole. 
As discussed in the paper, some of these limitations a may arise from difficulties in monitoring 
risks, difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of risk controls that are seldom used, or 
difficulties in anticipating the full range of systemic events. But other limitations arise 
endogenously from the decisions taken by human operators and the licensees. 
First, technological innovation permits efficiency savings and improved risk management (thus 
pushing out the protection envelope), but it may also create new risks (Foresight (2001) DR3). 
Rapid technological innovation could also limit the ability of regulators, operators and licensees 
to monitor and understand new risks, and apply new risk controls. 
Second, competition between key participants may create incentives to pursue profit-
maximising activities that are not necessarily risk-reducing. In the finance industry, competition 
between market participants, and between trading venues, has created incentives to invest in 
high-speed technology. This has caused some to worry about an ‘arms race’ (Haldane (2012)). 
In the nuclear industry licensees are not incentivised to take risks, in fact the reverse, and there 
is of course strong regulatory oversight21
                                            
21 Some commentators would disagree, see e.g. Perrow (2007) and the US nuclear industry  
. However misaligned economics incentives might 
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lead to lack of profitability with consequential reductions in investment with potential impact on 
safety culture and state of plant. 
Third, over time, risk frameworks may become obsolete as market participants and computer 
algorithms adapt their behaviour, risk frameworks may become obsolete. But adaptive 
behaviour has positive features too: feedback and learning are essential parts of a safety 
culture. The nuclear industry has its share of accidents and incidents (from Windscale to 
Fukushima) that cause reflection and reanalysis of its risk frameworks. 
Fourth, part of this adaptive behaviour may be a response to regulatory differences that at 
times exist between jurisdictions. In spite of efforts to create internationally-consistent risk 
frameworks, participants may have incentives to develop operations in jurisdictions where the 
regulatory burden is perceived to be lighter. This so-called regulatory arbitrage is constrained 
by fixed costs (e.g. developing new trading systems). Nonetheless, it is a concern in the 
finance industry and to a much lesser extent in the nuclear industry as moving plant between 
jurisdictions is not usually feasible. 
And finally, although both industries are so different in terms of the culture, technology, 
regulation, incentives, geography, history, rate of evolution, and their fundamental purpose, the 
fact that they both focus on societal significant systemic risks has provided the authors with a 
stimulating perspective on how risks might be evaluated, controlled and communicated in the 
future. 
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Glossary 
Term/Abbreviation Explanation 
ACSNI Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations 
BE 
BSL 
BSO 
British Energy 
Basic Safety Level 
Basic Safety Objective 
CAE Claims Arguments Evidence 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
GSN Goal-Structuring-Notation 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
HSW Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 
IAEA The International Atomic Energy Agency 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
NIA Nuclear Installations Act 1965 
NII Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
PFD Probability of failure on demand 
SAPs Safety Assessment Principles 
TAGs Technical Assessment Guides 
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The following table is extracted from Health and Safety Executive, “Nuclear Safety Assessment 
principles” (HSE (2006)) unless otherwise indicated. 
Term Explanation 
Accident 
 
Any unintended event, including operator errors, 
equipment failures or other mishaps, the 
consequences or potential consequences of which 
are not negligible from the point of view of 
protection or safety (IAEA Safety Glossary). In this 
document, and when used generally, the term 
‘accident’ includes any undesired circumstances 
which give rise to ill health or injury; damage to 
property, plant, products or the environment; 
production losses or increased liabilities. 
When referring to nuclear safety, ‘accident’ refers 
to a fault sequence resulting in a dose greater 
than 0.1 mSv to a worker, or greater than 0.01 
mSv to a person outside the site, or in a 
substantial unintended relocation of radioactive 
substances within the facility.  
Accident 
management 
The strategies which are developed to reduce the 
risks arising from accidents, and bring the facility 
to a safe, controlled state.  
Alarm 
 
An automatic visual or audible indication to 
personnel of when a specific plant variable or 
condition has reached a pre-set limit or state. 
Availability 
The fraction of time for which a system is capable 
of fulfilling its intended purpose (IAEA Safety 
Glossary).  
Barrier 
 
A means to: 
• prevent or inhibit the movement of people or 
radioactive substances, or some other 
phenomenon (eg fire); 
• provide shielding against radiation; 
• protect against some other potentially hazardous 
event. 
Best estimate 
 
When used to describe analysis, this refers to an 
analysis expected to provide the most accurate 
description of the fault and its consequences that 
could be achieved within the limitations of the 
analytical model employed without any deliberate 
bias being introduced. When used to describe the 
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Term Explanation 
data, it refers to the most accurate value of the 
data item derived from experiment, operating 
experience, judgement etc as appropriate. Where 
there is inadequate evidence, and no credible best 
estimate is possible, then bounding or 
conservative values should be used.  
Bounding case The case that represents the extreme 
consequences of a class of accidents. 
Class of accident 
 
A group of fault sequences that follow paths that 
are sufficiently similar to justify analysis of the 
sequences together as a class. 
Common cause 
failure (CCF) 
Failure of two or more structures, systems or 
components due to a single specific event or 
cause (IAEA Safety Glossary). 
Common mode 
failure (CMF)  
Failure of two or more structures, systems or 
components in the same manner or mode due to a 
single event or cause (IAEA Safety Glossary). 
Conservative 
estimate 
 
The use of models, data and assumptions which 
would be expected to lead to a result that bounds 
the best estimate (where known) on the safe side. 
The degree of conservatism should be 
proportionate to the level of uncertainty, and the 
overall significance of the estimate to the safety 
case. 
Containment 
 
Methods or physical structures designed to 
prevent the dispersion of radioactive substances 
(IAEA Safety Glossary). 
Countermeasures 
An action aimed at alleviating the radiological 
consequences of an accident (IAEA Safety 
Glossary). 
Defence in depth 
An approach to designing and operating nuclear 
facilities that prevents and mitigates accidents that 
release radiation or hazardous materials. The key 
is creating multiple independent and redundant 
layers of defense to compensate for potential 
human and mechanical failures so that no single 
layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied 
upon. Defense-in-depth includes the use of 
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Term Explanation 
access controls, physical barriers, redundant and 
diverse key safety functions, and emergency 
response measures. (NRC glossary) 
Design basis 
 
The range of conditions and events that should be 
explicitly taken into account in the design of the 
facility, according to established criteria, such that 
the facility can withstand them without exceeding 
authorised limits by the planned operation of 
safety systems (IAEA Safety Glossary). 
Design basis 
fault 
 
A fault (sequence) which the plant is designed to 
take or can be shown to withstand without 
unacceptable consequence, by virtue of the 
facility’s inherent characteristics or the safety 
systems. 
Diversity 
 
The presence of two or more systems or 
components to perform an identified function, 
where the systems or components have different 
attributes so as to reduce the possibility of 
common cause failure, including common mode 
failure (IAEA Safety Glossary).  
Dutyholder A person or corporate body who has a duty in law. 
Essential service 
 
Essential services are all those resources 
necessary to maintain the safety systems in an 
operational state at all times and may include 
electricity, gas, water, compressed air, fuel and 
lubricants. 
External hazard 
 
External hazards are those natural or man-made 
hazards to a site and facilities that originate 
externally to both the site and the process, i.e. the 
dutyholder may have very little or no control over 
the initiating event. 
Failure 
 
A failure has occurred when a structure, system or 
component fails to meet its safety function, or 
functions spuriously 
Failure modes  The manner or state in which a structure, system 
or component fails (IAEA Safety Glossary).  
Fault Any unplanned departure from the specified mode 
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Term Explanation 
 of operation of a structure, system or component 
due to a malfunction or defect within the structure, 
system or component or due to external influences 
or human error. 
Fault condition 
 
When used without qualification, this means 
design basis fault conditions and includes, where 
appropriate and as far as reasonably practicable, 
beyond design basis conditions. A combination of 
an initiating fault and any additional failures. 
Fault sequence 
 
A combination of an initiating fault and any 
additional failures, faults and internal or external 
hazards which have the potential to lead to 
accidents. 
Hazard 
 
The potential for harm arising from an intrinsic 
property or disposition of something to cause 
detriment (R2P21). See also internal and external 
hazards. 
Hazard potential The propensity for the harm from a hazard to be 
realised. 
Incident  An undesired circumstance or ‘near miss’ that has 
the potential to cause an accident. 
Inherent safety 
 
Preventing a specific harm occurring by using an 
approach, design or arrangement that ensures 
that the harm cannot happen, for example a 
criticality safe vessel. This is not the same as 
passive safety. 
Initiating fault 
 
 
The starting event of a fault sequence. This may 
be an internal failure or a fault caused by an 
internal or external hazard or by human action. 
This does not include pre-existing latent failures 
that may be revealed when safety equipment is 
called upon to function during a fault sequence. 
Intelligent 
customer  
An intelligent customer is the capability of an 
organisation to have a clear understanding and 
knowledge of the product or service being 
supplied. 
Internal hazard Internal hazards are those hazards to plant and 
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Term Explanation 
 structures that originate within the site boundary 
and over which the dutyholder has control over the 
initiating event in some form. 
Licensee 
The body corporate that has been granted a 
Nuclear Site Licence under the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965 (as amended), which 
permits it to carry out a defined scope of activities 
on a delineated site (NIA). 
Passive safety 
 
Providing and maintaining a safety function 
without the need for systems to be actively 
initiated or for operator intervention, or other 
safety system support features. In the context of 
decommissioning and the storage of nuclear 
matter, providing and maintaining a safety function 
by minimising the need for active safety systems, 
monitoring or prompt human intervention. A 
passive safety system is not necessarily inherently 
safe.  
Protection 
system 
 
A system that monitors the operation of a facility 
and which, on sensing an abnormal condition, 
automatically initiates actions to prevent an unsafe 
or potentially unsafe condition (based on IAEA 
Safety Glossary).  
Qualification 
 
The process of demonstrating that a structure, 
system or component is fit for its intended 
purpose.  
Redundancy 
 
Provision of alternative (identical or diverse) 
structures, systems or components, so that any 
one can perform the required function regardless 
of the state of operation or failure of any other 
(IAEA Safety Glossary).  
Risk 
 
Risk is the chance that someone or something is 
adversely affected in a particular manner by a 
hazard (R2P21). 
Safety actuation 
system  
The collection of equipment required to 
accomplish the necessary safety actions when 
initiated by the protection system (IAEA Safety 
Glossary).  
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Safety case 
 
In this document, ‘safety case’ refers to the totality 
of a licensee’s (or dutyholder’s) documentation to 
demonstrate safety, and any sub-set of this 
documentation that is submitted to NII. 
Safety function 
 
The safety function of a structure, system or 
component is the specific function required to 
maintain the facility within the safe operating limits 
and conditions determined by the fault analysis. 
Safety measure 
 
A safety system, or a combination of procedures, 
operator actions and safety systems that prevents 
or mitigates a radiological consequence, or a 
specific feature of plant designed to prevent or 
mitigate a radiological consequence by passive 
means. 
Safety-related 
system  
An item important to safety that is not part of a 
safety system (IAEA Safety Glossary).  
Safety system 
 
A system that acts in response to a fault to 
prevent or mitigate a radiological consequence.  
Safety schedule 
 
A schedule or other suitable means that identifies 
the minimum safety system requirements for each 
of the initiating faults, including internal and 
external hazards, identified within the design 
basis. A safety schedule may also be called a 
safety system or engineering or protection or fault 
and protection schedule. Other suitable means 
may include the use of configuration diagrams. 
Segregation 
The physical separation of components and 
systems, by distance or by some form of barrier 
that reduces the likelihood of common cause 
failures.  
Severe accident 
 
A fault sequence which leads either to 
consequences exceeding the highest radiological 
doses given in the BSLs of Target 4, or to a 
substantial unintended relocation of radioactive 
material within the facility which places a demand 
on the integrity of the remaining physical barriers.  
Societal 
concerns 
Societal concerns are the risks or threats from 
hazards which impact on society and which, if 
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 realised, could have adverse repercussions for the 
institutions responsible for putting in place the 
provisions and arrangements for protecting 
people.  
Societal effects 
 
A term used to describe those societal concerns 
that are capable of quantitative prediction such as 
numbers of deaths or injuries, numbers of people 
evacuated, area of land contaminated and general 
economic loss. 
Societal risk 
 
The risk of an accident causing the death of a 
specified number of people in a single event from 
a single major industrial activity, ie an activity from 
which risk is assessed as a whole and is under the 
control of one company in one location, or within a 
site boundary. 
Validation 
 
Dependent on context: 
1. The process of determining whether a product 
or service is adequate to perform its intended 
function satisfactorily. 
 Computer system validation: The process of 
testing and evaluation of the integrated computer 
system (hardware and software) to ensure 
compliance with the functional, performance and 
interface requirements. 
 Model validation: The process of determining 
whether a model is an adequate representation of 
the real system being modelled, by comparing the 
predictions of the model with observations of the 
real system. 
 System code validation: Assessment of the 
accuracy of values predicted by the system code 
against the relevant experimental data for the 
important phenomena expected 
to occur. 
2. Confirmation by means of objective evidence 
that the requirements for a specific intended 
purpose and use or application have been fulfilled 
(IAEA Safety Glossary). 
Verification 
Dependent on context: 
1. The process of determining whether the quality 
or performance of a product or service is as 
stated, as intended or as required. 
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 Computer system verification: The process of 
ensuring that a phase in the system life-cycle 
meets the requirements imposed on it by the 
previous phase. 
 Model verification: The process of determining 
whether a computational model correctly 
implements the intended conceptual model or 
mathematical model. 
 System code verification: Review of source 
coding in relation to its description in the system 
code documentation. 
2. Confirmation by means of objective evidence 
that specified requirements have been fulfilled 
(IAEA Safety Glossary).  
Veto  Inhibition of a safety system. 
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